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In recent years, web applications have become an integral part of our routine life. 
Numerous transactions are performed online daily including, online shopping, financial 
transactions information sharing and communication. Similar to other computing systems, 
web applications are prone to security vulnerabilities. Hence, vulnerabilities that impact 
the security perspective of web applications should be detected and removed from their 
code base. To date, researchers and industrial practitioners have identified that SQL 
injection and cross site scripting are main security vulnerabilities for web applications. 
The overarching objective of our work is to detect the SQL injection and Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the source code of web applications by generating the 
attack scenarios. 
In this research work, we have developed an automated technique based on Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) to detect and correct SQL Injection (SQLI) security vulnerabilities in web 
applications. Our approach allows the automatic SQLI attacks generation using Genetic 
Algorithm to detect and correct SQLI vulnerabilities by identifying the malicious queries 
in the source code. Furthermore, we have developed a tool to implement and empirically 
evaluate our adopted approach. The tool implements two primary processes: first, the 
preliminary static analysis of the given source code to identify the vulnerable queries and 
xv 
 
second is the generation of SQLI attacks for the identified vulnerable queries in first step 
using genetic algorithm. In order to correct the detected SQLI vulnerabilities, we used 
simple refactoring approach. To empirically evaluate our tool, we used several open 
source projects and available source code to detect SQLI vulnerabilities. the tool 
successfully detected and generated the SQLI attacks for the given source code and 
refactored it to prevent from SQLI.  
Furthermore, we formulated XSS vulnerabilities detection problem as optimization 
problem and solved it using genetic algorithm. We combined the static code analysis with 
genetic algorithms to identify and generate attack scenarios for XSS vulnerabilities. The 
purpose of static analysis is to identify the sensitive sinks in the source code. After 
identification of sensitive sinks, we then converted the source code into control flow tree 
and developed the control paths to reach the identified sensitive sinks. The control flow 
paths are tested using genetic algorithm by generating the XSS attack scenarios with the 
help of XSS database. The experimental results indicate that our approach is useful for 
security penetration testing. 
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 ملخص الرسالة
 
  مران نافيد محمد رفيقس  :الكاملالاسم 
 منهج متعدد الأهداف لكشف وتصحيح الثغرات الأمنية في تطبيقات الويب  عنوان الرسالة:
 علم الحاسب الاّلي  التخصص:
 6102مايو  :تاريخ الدرجة العلمية
 
يتم تنفيذ عدد مهول من العمليات على الانترنت  .في السنوات الأخيرة، أصبحت تطبيقات الويب جزءا لا يتجزأ من حياتنا اليومية
على غرار أنظمة الحوسبة الأخرى،  .يوميا بما في ذلك، التسوق عبر الانترنت، والمعاملات المالية وتبادل المعلومات والاتصالات
ي الأمنية لتطبيقات الويب بالتالي، فان نقاط الضعف التي تؤثر على النواح .تعتبر تطبيقات الإنترنت عرضة لنقاط الضعف الأمنية
لغة  حتى الآن، حدد الباحثون والممارسون في المجال الصناعي ان حقن .تتطلب أن يتم الكشف عنها وإزالتها من كودها الاساسي
الاستعلامات المهيكلة والبرمجة عبر المواقع ومراجع الكائنات المباشرة غير المؤمنة يعتبرون من الثغرات الأمنية الرئيسية 
لغة الاستعلامات المهيكلة والبرمجة عبر المواقع في  الهدف الأسمى من بحثنا هذا هو الكشف عن ثغرات حقن .طبيقات الويبلت
 .مصدر التعليمات البرمجية لتطبيقات الويب عن طريق توليد سيناريوهات الهجوم
لغة الاستعلامات المهيكلة في  وتصحيح ثغرات حقنلتحديد  في هذا البحث، قمنا بتطوير تقنية آلية بناء على الخوارزميات الجينية
وعلاوة على ذلك، قمنا بتطوير أداة لتنفيذ وتقييم طريقتنا  .تطبيقات الويب عن طريق تحديد الاستعلامات الخبيثة في شفرة المصدر
ستفسارات الضعيفة والثاني هو أولا، التحليل الثابت الأولي للكود المعطى للتعرف على الا :الأداة تنفذ عمليتين أساسية. المتبعة
لغة  من أجل تصحيح ثغرات حقن .لغة الاستعلامات المهيكلة من الخطوة الاولى باستخدام الخوارزمية الجينية توليد هجمات حقن
مفتوحة لتقييم اداتنا تجريبيا، استخدمنا العديد من المشاريع . الاستعلامات المهيكلة المكتشفة، استخدمنا نهج إعادة هيكلة بسيطة
لغة الاستعلامات  الاداة نجحت في الكشف وتوليد هجمات حقن. لغة الاستعلامات المهيكلة المصدر وكود متاح لتحديد ثغرات حقن
 وعلاوة على ذلك، قمنا بصياغة مشكلة كشف ثغرات البرمجة عبر المواقع. المهيكلة للكود المعطى واعادة هيكلته لمنع الثغرات
نحن جمعنا بين التحليل الثابت مع الخوارزميات الجينية لتحديد وإعداد  .باستخدام الخوارزمية الجينيةكمشكلة تحسينيه وحلها 
سيناريوهات الهجوم على نقاط ضعف البرمجة عبر المواقع. الغرض من التحليل الثابت هو تحديد المنافذ الحساسة في شفرة 
يل شفرة المصدر إلى شجرة التحكم في التدفق وطورنا مسارات التحكم بعد تحديد المنافذ الحساسة، قمنا بعد ذلك بتحو .المصدر
 iivx
 
مسارات التحكم في التدفق بعد ذلك، تم اختبارها باستخدام الخوارزمية الجينية عن  .للوصول إلى المنافذ الحساسة التي تم تحديدها
وتشير . لبرمجة عبر المواقع التي تم تطويرهاطريق توليد سيناريوهات هجوم البرمجة عبر المواقع مع مساعدة من قاعدة بيانات ل
  .النتائج التجريبية أن طريقتنا مفيدة لاختبار الاختراق الأمني
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last couple of decades, web applications have become main stream and are used 
for numerous daily transactions such as online shopping, financial transactions, 
information sharing and communication. Despite widespread use of web applications, 
security threats or security vulnerabilities in web applications are still a big challenge. 
According to semantic internet security report [1], 75% of the scanned web applications 
were detected to have some sort of vulnerabilities. And 20% of detected vulnerabilities 
were considered critical. As a result, a number of organizations have lost billions of dollars 
due these security vulnerabilities. For example, the yearly cost of cyber crime to the 
worldwide economy was evaluated to be around US$400 billion [2]. 
To date, researchers and industrial practitioners have identified that SQL injection and 
cross site scripting are main security vulnerabilities for web applications. The overarching 
objectives of our work is to detect and correct the SQL injection and cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities in the source code of web applications by generating the attack scenarios. 
In this research work, we have developed an automated technique, based on Genetic 
Algorithm (GA), to detect and correct SQL Injection (SQLI) security vulnerabilities in web 
applications. Our approach allows the automatic SQL injection attacks generation using 
Genetic Algorithm to detect and correct SQL injection vulnerabilities by identifying the 
malicious queries in the source code. Furthermore, we have developed a tool to implement 
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and empirically evaluate our adopted approach. The tool implements two primary 
processes: first, the preliminary static analysis of the given source code to identify the 
vulnerable queries and second is the generation of SQL injection attacks for the identified 
vulnerable queries in first step using genetic algorithm. In order to correct the detected SQL 
injection vulnerabilities, we used simple refactoring approach. To empirically evaluate our 
tool, we used several open source projects and available source code to detect SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. the tool successfully detected and generated the SQL injection 
attacks for the given source code and refactored it to prevent from SQL injection attacks.  
Next, we proposed an approach to detect XSS vulnerabilities. Our proposed approach 
combines the static source code analysis with genetic algorithm. The primary aim of using 
static code analysis is to identify the sensitive sinks (vulnerable code points) in the source 
code. The code identified with sensitive sinks is prone to security vulnerabilities so, we 
generated the control flow paths of the vulnerable code to cover all sensitive sinks in the 
code. To illustrate the control flow paths, we also generated the graphical trees. Typically, 
a program may contain a large number of control flow paths if it contains loops in it. To 
cover all control flow paths is not possible using traditional algorithms. Hence, we used 
genetic algorithms to generate XSS attack scenarios to exploit the sensitive sinks identified 
by static code analysis in those control flow paths. We designed a database of XSS attack 
pattern by collecting the attack patterns from different resources on internet. The XSS 
detections starts with static code analysis. We generate tried to cover maximum control 
flow paths in the provided source code and these control flow paths are being tested using 
genetic algorithm. Our genetic approach generates XSS attack by using the XSS attack 
patterns database and applying them on the control flow paths. 
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1.1 Research Objectives 
The objective of this research work is to detect and correct SQL injection and cross site 
scripting vulnerabilities in the source code of web applications by generating the attack 
scenarios. The sub-objectives of this thesis are described below. 
 Identify common security vulnerabilities in the source code of web applications. 
 Literature review of existing techniques and methods that detect and correct SQL 
injection and cross site scripting security vulnerabilities.  
 Applying the genetic algorithm to detect SQL injection security vulnerabilities in 
source code.  
 Correct the identified vulnerable queries using the refactoring technique to mitigate 
the SQL injection. 
 Apply genetic approach to detect Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities by generating 
the attack scenarios. 
1.2 Main Contributions 
The main contributions to this thesis are as follows:   
 Literature review of the current vulnerabilities detection techniques. 
 Genetic algorithm based detection technique to detect SQL injection vulnerabilities 
in source code. 
 A tool implementing the described approach for detection and correction of SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. 
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 Genetic approach to detect cross site scripting vulnerabilities by generating the 
attack scenarios. 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized into chapters; each chapter describes a specific part of the whole 
work. The following chapter 2 provide a detailed background about the most common 
security vulnerabilities in web applications and their possible threats. Along with that, the 
details about how users with negative intent can exploit the SQL vulnerabilities by injecting 
exploits and SQL Injection is illustrated with examples. And the last thing in chapter 2 is 
the details of Genetic Algorithm (GA). Some of the existing techniques for the detection 
and correction of vulnerabilities in web applications are presented in Chapter 3 as a 
Literature Review. The existing techniques are also classified based on their underlying 
methods to mitigate the problem. Chapter 4 presents the formulation and details about our 
adopted approach to detect and correct the SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web 
applications. The experimental setup, experiments details, and results are discussed in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 describes the genetic approach for cross site scripting vulnerabilities 
detection and Chapter 7 provided its empirical evaluation details for cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities detection approach. Finally, the last Chapter 8 concludes the complete work 
along with the discussion of possible validity threats and provides future directions. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Security Vulnerabilities 
The security vulnerabilities with most serious risks identified by OWASP are as follows. 
Most critical of them are briefly described. 
2.1.1 Injection Vulnerabilities 
Injection vulnerabilities are related to SQL, OS, and LDAP, this is the most recurring attack 
and it has severe impacts. Attackers can send a malicious text with Queries or input data to 
the system to execute illegal operations. The consequences of injection are critical it can 
result in sensitive data corruption, deletion or denial of access in extreme case it can result 
in complete host takeover. Injection attacks normally found in LDAP, NoSQL queries or 
XPath, OS commands; SMTP Headers, XML parsers, program arguments. 
2.1.2 Cross Site Scripting 
XSS is the most prevailing security vulnerability it occurs whenever user provide an 
untrusted data and application sends it directly to the browser without escaping or prior 
validation. If XSS is exploited the attacker can deface websites, take over user sessions, or 
redirect to malicious websites. 
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2.1.3 Broken Authentication and Session Management 
Web applications use sessions to manage the user authentications and to preserve account 
login details. Users with vicious intentions can take advantage of leaks or flaws in the 
session management to disclose the confidential information e.g. account passwords, 
session ids. This vulnerability can cause the leakage of confidential information and 
account hacking. 
2.1.4 Insecure Direct Object References 
Attackers can exploit direct object referencing and can access to unauthorized data. The 
causes of insecure direct object references are the direct exposure of a reference to an 
internal object, for instance, database connections, file objects and directory. 
2.1.5 Security Misconfiguration 
Web applications comprise of many things, such as frameworks, web servers, platform, 
application server and database server. They all should be securely configured and updated 
to latest versions. If these things are not securely configured, then the system could be 
compromised completely without you knowing it. Furthermore, other significant 
vulnerabilities along with mentioned above are, sensitive data exposure, missing function 
level access control, cross site request forgery, using components with known 
vulnerabilities and invalidated redirects and forwards. 
2.2 SQL Injection Attacks by Examples 
Modern web applications mostly consist of web pages which contain the logics and views 
and a database system at the backend to save the records. Most of the applications do 
provide login forms for their users to log in to the system, these login forms usually contain 
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a username, password field and forget the password or email me my password link. This 
link can be proved as the downfall of the system if it’s not handled carefully. When user 
enter his email while using the email me my password link, it presumably searches in the 
database for the user email and send something to the provided email. To test if the SQL 
query for searching the email from database is created with some security parameters or 
without any sanitization of the user input we add a single quote with input value. If we get 
a server failure error (500 error) it means that the vulnerable input is parsed and SQL 
structure will as follows:  
SELECT fields_names FROM table WHERE field = '$email'; 
In the above query $email is the variable which will be replaced by user provided email 
address. We do not have any information about the fields and the tables yet, but we can 
make some good guesses. When we enter samran@yahoo.com', observe the single quote 
and the end it will yield the SQL query something like this. 
SELECT fields_names FROM table WHERE field = 'samran@yahoo.com''; 
When the system will execute the above constructed query, the SQL parser will find and 
abort it due the extra single quote and will return a syntax error. This response error is a 
dead exposure that user provided input is not sanitized and that the system is exploitable. 
As the input values user provide are used in WHERE clause, so the user can manipulate it 
and change the behavior of the query legally. For example, if we enter anything' OR 'x'='x 
the resulting query will be. 
SELECT fields_name FROM table WHERE field = 'anything' OR 'x'='x'; 
8 
 
As we already have identified that the application is not concerning about the query, it’s 
just constructing a string, so our provided input will turn this query from single component 
WHERE clause to two component clause. And the second clause we provided 'x'='x' will 
always return true no matter what is in first clause. Unlike the original query, which is 
intended to return only one item each time, the modified version will must return every 
details in the database. This was the basic example how we can guess and modify the SQL 
query structure to alter its behavior. Following few sections will illustrate some of the 
different scenarios of SQL Injection to perform various functions. 
2.2.1 Schema field mapping 
Now we have described the basics of SQL injection and how to alter the query structure by 
injecting the malicious strings into it. In this example we will illustrate how we can guess 
the schema mapping of the system to get the fields names. The initial steps are to guess the 
names of some fields, for example we are fairly sure that the login query contains an email 
address and password, in addition to that there may be few other fields like “address”, 
“userid” or “phone_number”. We would affectionately like to execute SHOW TABLE 
query, but we do not know the name of the table yet, along with that there is no other means 
to get the result of this query routed to us. So we will approach it in steps in each case, we 
will start with the email field, the following example will illustrate the query structure to 
guess the field name. as we have already shown that at the end of the query we can embed 
malicious strings in where clauses. 
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE field = 'x' AND email IS NULL; --'; 
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Here our objective is not to match the email address or to crack the password, instead we 
want to guess the field name. so, if we get a server error it means that our query is 
malformed and server throw a syntax error. Otherwise if we get response like unknown 
email address or password it means we have correctly guessed the field name. now in the 
above shown query the we have used “x'” with AND operator and at the end of the string 
there is -- which means the start of the SQL comment, and this is a clean and nice way to 
get rid of the last single quote. In this particular example we have used conjunction (AND) 
we can also use OR operator instead.  
2.2.2 Finding the Table Name 
As a user we do not know the table name, although it is already embedded in the query. 
There are several ways to find out the table name, in the following example we will 
illustrate one of them, which is by using a sub query that returns the count in of records in 
a table e.g. SELECT COUNT (*) FROM tab_name. 
We can embed this sub query in to the original query to probe the guessing of table name, 
obviously it will return an error if it fails due to the wrong name of table mentioned in it. 
SELECT email, passwd, login_id, full_name FROM table WHERE email = 'x' AND 1= 
(SELECT COUNT (*) FROM tabname); --'; 
We are not concerned about the number of records in the table at the moment we are only 
looking to guess the table name. After several trails we eventually find out that the table 
name is members. To verify this, we re-write our query with the guessed name and check 
the response. Similarly, there are many other scenarios that can be formulated and executed 
by appending them with the queries. 
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2.3 Cross Site Scripting Consequences and Examples 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is another type of injection vulnerabilities in web applications. 
The difference between SQL injection vulnerabilities and Cross Site Scripting 
vulnerabilities is that, SQL injection is server side vulnerability and Cross Site Scripting is 
client side vulnerability. XSS is one of the most flagrant vulnerability and it occurs when 
an attacker injects malicious script into a legitimate website which then can be executed in 
client’s web browsers. It usually occurs when a web application uses an un-encoded and 
un-validated data and process it along with its output. 
An attacker does not directly affect the victim using XSS, instead the attacker exploits the 
XSS vulnerability in another website which the victim would visits. The intention is to use 
the vulnerable site as a medium to deliver the malicious code into the victim’s web browser. 
Usually attackers inject JavaScript code in vulnerable websites as JavaScript is executable 
in almost all modern browsers. For example,  
Figure 1 is showing the simplest example of printing comments from database in PHP. The 
problem in the illustrated example is that, the code is assuming the comments consists of 
text only and not escaping or validating them prior to printing. In this example the attacker 
may insert a JavaScript snippet (e.g. <script>alert (‘something vulnerable.’) </script>) as 
shown in  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 which will be executed every time browser will load these comments. 
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Figure 1. Print Comments from Database in PHP 
 
 
Figure 2. Simple Cross Site Scripting Example 
 
JavaScript its self is not harmful, in fact most of the browsers executes JavaScript in a very 
restrict manner and it does not have access to server files and operating systems. However, 
it becomes malicious due to the following facts. 
 JavaScript has access to user’s sensitive information like Cookies 
 JavaScript can send HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations with arbitrary content 
using XMLHttpRequest mechanism. 
 JavaScript can make modifications in HTML content using DOM manipulation 
methods. 
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Figure 3. Cross Site Scripting Attack Scenario 
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2.3.1 Consequences of Malicious JavaScript Code 
An attacker can perform various kind of malicious activities if he found a way to execute 
JavaScript in someone other’s browsers. A simple attack scenario of Cross Site Scripting 
is shown in Figure 3 which is illustrating how an attacker can inject malicious code into a 
website and how that malicious code then can compromise the security of an individual. 
Some of the security risks of XSS are described below. 
Cookie theft 
Attacker can execute a JavaScript in victim’s browser to send him the victim’s cookie 
details. which he can use to extract sensitive information like Session Ids and user tokens. 
Keylogging 
Another security thread of Cross Site Scripting is that; the attacker can register event 
listeners in victim’s browser. The registered event listeners can send any thing victim will 
type this may result in sensitive information leakage like credit card numbers, passwords 
and confidential conversations.  
Phishing 
Phishing is another kind of Cross Site Scripting attack in which the attacker can replicate 
a legitimate webpage and can make the victim to provide sensitive information like user 
name, password and credit card numbers. Another approach for phishing is that the attacker 
can use DOM manipulation and insert a fake form with form’s action set to his server. As 
a result, the details provided in the form will be submitted to the attacker’s server. 
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2.3.2 Types of Cross Site Scripting 
There are different ways of executing the malicious JavaScript in victim’s browser to 
perform Cross Site Scripting attacks. Majorly Cross Site Scripting is divided into three 
types, those are described below. 
Persistent XSS 
Persistent XSS is one of the most serious kind of XSS vulnerability. Malicious JavaScript 
can be stored into website’s database and results into persistent XSS when the website 
insert user input into its database without any sanitization and checking [3]. 
Reflected XSS 
Reflected XSS type of vulnerabilities are not loaded with the website it actually loads when 
the victim tries to load the injected website. They are also called non-persistent or type-one 
Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities [4]. 
DOM Based XSS 
DOM based XSS vulnerabilities are based on client side. The attackers use DOM 
manipulation to deface or to change the forms and their action attributes in the website, so 
all the data which victim will provide in that form will be sent to the attacker [5]. Figure 4. 
is showing a DOM based attack scenario. DOM based XSS vulnerabilities are different 
from Persistent and Reflected XSS vulnerabilities. The subtle difference is the traditional 
XSS (reflected and persistent) executed when the website is loaded in client’s browser 
while the DOM based XSS executed after the loading of website as result of not handling 
the legitimate JavaScript properly. 
15 
 
 
Figure 4. DOM based XSS attack Scenario 
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Figure 5. Genetic Algorithm Overview 
2.4 Genetic Algorithm 
Genetic algorithm (GA) inspired by theory of evolution is a search heuristic algorithm. 
Genetic algorithm often used to search solution for optimization problems. The solution to 
a problem solved by genetic algorithm is evolved. For large search spaces and np-complete 
problems genetic algorithms are suitable. Genetic algorithm evolves a population of 
generations. Each generation consists of a solution, and the most fit or most relevant 
generation is selected as the final solution. To reach the final solution multiple populations 
generated and the most-fit generation has higher chance to survive in next generation. In 
the new population the generations undergo crossover and mutation processes. Figure 5. is 
showing the main steps of GA which includes, population generation, evaluation of 
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individuals, crossover, mutation and reproduction. Following few sections will briefly 
describe the GA processes. 
Population: population consists of different generations called chromosomes or 
individuals and each chromosome consist of genes. In chromosome the genes encoding is 
problem specific. In some problems genes could be encoded as binary bits and in some 
other problems genes could be characters or strings. Each population consists of a 
reasonable length of chromosomes. When algorithm run for the first time it generates the 
population randomly. 
Evaluation: once the population has been generated and initialized it is evaluated to 
calculate its chromosome’s fitness. To evaluate fitness of a chromosome a certain function 
used which is called fitness function. Similar to genes encoding the fitness function is 
problem specific for example, for one kind of problem fitness function could be simple 
expression while for other kind of problem it could be a complete equation. All the 
chromosomes undergo the evaluation process to find the most fitted chromosome in the 
population. The calculated fitness of a certain chromosome is compared with the max 
fitness, if it is equal to max fitness it means this is the most fit chromosome and also this 
contains the solution. If it is not equal to max fitness the algorithm will check next 
chromosome until it found the solution of most fit chromosome in the current population. 
If algorithm unable to find the solution in current population, it will reproduce new 
population and check the fitness of all chromosomes again. 
Selection (Reproduction): We want to improve the populations overall fitness. Selection 
helps us to improve the fitness by rejecting the bad chromosomes and keeping the best 
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chromosomes in the population.  There are different selection methods but the basic idea 
is same, that fitter chromosomes will be selected for next generation. Tournament Selection 
approach to select chromosomes for next generation is usually preferred. The reason is to 
avoid the algorithm to stuck in local optimum and to converge at global optimum solution. 
Crossover: crossover is the process that create a new chromosome by partially inheriting 
genes from two different chromosomes. Once the chromosomes are selected for new 
generation they undergo the process of crossover. Crossover can be performed at different 
rate or probability. 
Mutation: mutation is the process in which a gene of a chromosome is changed randomly. 
That idea is to produce a variety of new population with vast attributes. 
Repeat: the process of selection, crossover and mutation is repeated until the algorithm 
found the solution. Or the population fitness is not improving for a certain number of 
generations. For example, if the fitness of the generation is stuck to a specific number and 
it is not improved since 100 generations then the algorithm should terminate. 
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3 CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section we will describe the most recurring security vulnerabilities and the proposed 
techniques to detect these security vulnerabilities in literature. And at the end of this section 
a summary table is presented illustrating the focus and main idea of existing techniques.  
Web applications gained popularity in the start of twentieth century and at the same era 
researcher started the investigation on vulnerabilities to detect and prevent from them. An 
online community started a project [6] and dedicated it to application’s security. They have 
identified and ranked the web applications vulnerabilities according to their well-defined 
and well versed Risk Rating Methodology. Along with the identification and raking, well 
documented recommendations also provided for programmers, testers and organizations to 
avoid and fix these vulnerabilities. In the following section we will describe some of the 
existing techniques for detection and correction of vulnerabilities in web applications. 
3.1 Existing Detection and Correction Techniques  
3.1.1 Taint Analysis Based Techniques 
Yau-Wen Huang in [7] considered the web applications vulnerabilities as secure 
information flow problem and developed a tool to prevent the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities on runtime. The tool, they developed named WebSSARI (Web application 
Security by Static Analysis and Runtime Inspection). In the tool they used lattice based 
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static code analysis algorithm. The problem in their approach and tool is that they only 
guarding the vulnerabilities not actually removing them from the code. 
Another static code analysis approach is described in [8] by N. Jovanovic et al. the 
approach presented in this research work used alias analysis, and they integrated their 
concept into a static analysis tool to test its credibility. But again, their approach is limited 
to specific vulnerability and the identified vulnerabilities have to be fixed manually by the 
programmer. 
W.G.J. Halfond [9], proposed a technique to protect the web applications against SQL 
injection vulnerabilities, their technique is based of taint analysis and syntax aware 
evaluation. The proposed technique used positive taint analysis which if different from 
traditional taint analysis. Positive taint analysis refers to identification and marking of 
trusted input data, while on the other hand traditional taint analysis identify and mark the 
untrusted data and prevent it from being used in exploitable way. To verify the data marked 
as trusted by positive tainting, syntax aware evaluation is performed on it before being sent 
to database. 
N. Jovanovic et al. [10] presented static code analysis approach and implemented their 
approach in tool called Pixy. In their approach they used inter-procedural, context-sensitive 
data flow and flow-sensitive analysis to discover vulnerable points in a program. In 
addition to above mentioned methods, literal and alias analysis are utilized to improve the 
precision and correctness of the results. The methodology can be applied to the 
identification of SQL injection and cross site scripting, because the presented concepts are 
targeted at the general class of taint-style vulnerabilities. 
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S. Son [11] proposed a new classification of security vulnerabilities in PHP web 
applications and as a solution a framework has been presented, which comprises of several 
new algorithms to identify potential security vulnerabilities that existing techniques can 
easily miss. The proposed approach implemented as a tool named SaferPHP that can 
identify different kind of potential vulnerabilities in PHP applications. SaferPHP comprises 
of six modules; computing the control-flow graph, computing the call graph, Taint analysis, 
Tainted loops and symbolic execution, collecting critical variables, Security analysis 
modules. Security analysis modules comprises further on three sub models, finding denial 
of service vulnerabilities, finding missing authorization checks and Finding other 
vulnerabilities. 
Another framework for detection of security vulnerabilities in PHP applications is 
described by J. Zhao and R. Gong [12]. In this framework, they combined two existing 
analysis techniques those are static analysis and dynamic analysis this combination of two 
techniques helped in improving the efficiency of detection. A tool based on HHVM also 
developed to empirically evaluate their framework. HHVM is an open source virtual 
machine it is used to compile PHP or Hack script to speed up service delivery and it is 
designed by Facebook. 
M. K. Gupta [13] proposed a technique which is based on pattern matching and static taint 
analysis. The proposed technique is context-sensitive and designed to detect and mitigate 
the cross site scripting vulnerabilities in the source code of web applications. A prototype 
of the proposed approach in shape of a tool is implemented to empirically evaluate the 
credibility of the technique. 
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3.1.2 Runtime Enforcement Techniques 
Tadeusz Pietraszek [14] proposed CCSE approach to serialize the user input on runtime. 
This approach does not require any programmer interaction or code modifications to 
prevent various kind of Injection vulnerabilities. This is a preventive approach, which 
avoid exploitations of Injection vulnerabilities by serializing the user inputs. 
O. Hallaraker and G. Vigna [15] proposed an approach to avoid cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities. In their approach they introduced an auditing system for the JavaScript’s 
interpreter for Mozilla web browser. In their auditing system they used and intrusion 
detection system (IDS) which detect exploitable execution of JavaScript operations, and 
the same time take appropriate counter-measures to avoid from infringement against the 
browser’s security. The key idea behind the proposed approach is to identify the scenarios 
of executions of a script written in JavaScript, in which the browser resources are used 
abusively.  
S. Gupta et al. [16] analyzed issues in the performance of existing cross site scripting filters 
approach, based on that, the author proposed a framework named XSS immune. The 
proposed framework based on string comparison and context aware sanitization of 
JavaScript. The framework is integrated inside the browser and compares the scripts 
embedded in the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) request and response to identify any 
malicious or untrusted JavaScript code. The proposed framework can also determine the 
context of detected XSS vulnerabilities and then it can sanitize them accordingly to 
alleviate their effects on the real time web applications. Furthermore, the framework is also 
capable of detecting the partial script injections, which can inject the malicious parameter 
values in the exiting JavaScript. 
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M. Alenezi et al. [17] analyzed several open source projects to identify different kind of 
vulnerabilities and their causes. They identified SQL inject, CSRF and cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities and find out that, these are the results of programmer’s negligence, bad 
programming practices and the maintenance and enhancement activities. Author also 
claimed that the open source projects are widely used by organizations to save cost but it 
also leads them vulnerable to security attacks. Furthermore, they made two suggestions to 
cope with security vulnerabilities, first before selecting any open source platform the 
system analyst should analyze the size, type and the attacks those can be done on the under 
consideration web application. Before finalizing the considered platform, the analyst 
should also consider the expertise of the programmers to avoid bigger problems. Finally, 
the organization should develop a secure development framework to urge developers to 
follow best and secure programming practices to avoid leaving loop holes in the code. The 
framework should be flexible enough to select previous projects and remove their 
vulnerabilities. Last but not least, the framework should be dynamic and should be easily 
updatable to accommodate the latest threats and vulnerabilities as they emerge with time. 
S. Cho et al. [18] presented a runtime validation and security enforcement approach to 
prevent from security vulnerabilities. The proposed approach can work with the web 
applications developed in Java server pages (JSP). The approach enforces the verification 
of input values using static bytecode instrumentation at runtime. The underlying technique 
searches for object constructors or target methods in compiled Java classes, and inserts 
bytecode modules statically. Their approach successfully identified and mitigated the SQL 
injection vulnerabilities in WebGoat project. 
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3.1.3 Testing Based Techniques 
Yau-Wen Huang et al. [19] described mechanisms to apply different testing techniques like 
dynamic analysis, black box testing, behavior monitoring and fault injection to identify 
SQL injection and Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities in web applications. 
R. Akrout [20] presented a new methodology, the proposed methodology based on black 
box analysis of the target application. The mechanism of their approach is they actually 
exploit the identified vulnerability in order to make it more accurate. An additional aspect 
of the proposed approach is that it can devise different potential attack scenarios including 
the exploitation of several successive vulnerabilities, taking into account explicitly the 
dependencies between these vulnerabilities. The main focus is to identify on the code 
security vulnerabilities, such as SQL injections. An experimental evaluation is also 
provided of the proposed approach by developing the prototype of the approach in a tool. 
N. M. Vithanage et al. [21] presented a tool based on their proposed approach named 
WebGaurdia, which is capable of detecting top five web application vulnerabilities among 
top ten. Two new approaches have been proposed in this paper to detect two types of 
vulnerabilities and already existing approaches have been highly modified in order to 
enhance the performance of the system. On completion of the tests, a report is generated 
along with a user friendly graphical overview of the detected vulnerabilities which can 
accordingly be used to find in detailed information regarding the executed attacks. The 
results indicate that, even though it is technically infeasible to completely avoid generation 
of false positives and false negatives, by using WebGuardia and proposed approaches, 
generation of false positives and negatives can be kept at a minimum level. 
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M. R. Reddy et al. [22] presented another penetration testing based approach to detect 
vulnerabilities in web applications. They illustrated the importance of mathematical 
constructs in the development of efficient test data generators. They proposed penetration 
testing approach for web applications security testing using several tools in which the tools 
scan for vulnerabilities and security loop holes in the web applications and finally they 
performed security audit based on these scanning results. 
3.1.4 Prevention Based Techniques 
D. Scott and R. Sharp [23] suggested to use a proxy server at web applications site to 
monitor and filter the incoming and outgoing data. But there are limitations in this 
approach, the deployment of monitoring and filtering proxy server would create scalability 
and performance limitations. Another filtering technique is proposed by Z. Su and G. 
Wassermann in [24], the proposed approach filter out the malicious data by using syntactic 
criterion. The solution is quite efficient in analyzing queries to detect misuses, by wrapping 
the malicious statement to avoid the final stage of an attack. The lack in this approach is 
that, it is language dependent and for the time being the organization does not seem a trivial 
task.  
B.Hanmanthu et al. [25] presented an approach to prevent from SQL injection 
vulnerabilities. Their proposed approach sends different specially formulated SQL attacks 
to an application. After that, they construct a decision tree model to create a database of 
the responses of SQL injection attacks. 
H. Zhang et al. [26] presented an accurate and practical prevention approach for SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. Their approach based on taint analysis and mark the trusted 
sensitive data into extended utf-8 encodings. Unlike typical positive taint analysis solutions 
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that taint all characters in hard-coded strings written by the developer, we only taint the 
trusted sensitive characters in these hard-coded strings. Furthermore, rather than modifying 
Web application interpreter to track taint information in extra memories, we encode the 
taint metadata into the bytes of trusted sensitive characters, by utilizing the characteristics 
of UTF-8 encoding. Lastly, we identify and escape untrusted sensitive characters in SQL 
statements to prevent SQL injection attacks, without parsing the SQL statements. A 
prototype called PHPGate is implemented as an extension on the PHP Zend engine. The 
evaluation results show that PHPGate can protect Web applications from real world SQL 
injection attacks and introduce a low performance overhead 
3.1.5 Other Techniques 
I. Medeiros [27] proposed a technique which is basically a combination of two methods to 
detect security vulnerabilities in web applications with minimum number of false positives. 
The proposed approach combined taint analysis which identify the potential security 
vulnerabilities, with data mining technique, which predicts the existence of false positives 
in the identified vulnerabilities. The presented approach unites two approaches that are 
seemingly orthogonal; taint analysis and machine learning. Along with the combination of 
two important methods for detection of vulnerabilities, the author proposed automatic 
corrections of the detected vulnerabilities by embedding solutions to source code. 
D. G. Kumar and M. Chatterjee [28] described a model for SQL injection attack detection. 
To detect SQL injections, they used the concept of information theory. The proposed 
framework works on both ends, client end and server end. The key idea is to implement a 
filter algorithm on Client side that checks the data type and length of the submitted 
variables, and issue warnings of the keywords and injection sensitive characters on Client 
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side after preliminary examination. And on the Server side the proposed approach works 
in two phases first training and then detection. The complexity of the query is calculated 
in training phase statically and when it is submitted dynamically which is called entropy 
of the. Once the entropy is calculated an algorithm called Message authentication algorithm 
(MAC) is applied on both entropies. If the query is altered with attack inputs it means its 
structure has been changed, therefore the entropy of the query has changed significantly 
which will change the corresponding MAC value. Change in values of MAC indicates SQL 
injection. 
Another recent research work presented by Aziz et al. [29] proposed a genetic algorithm 
approach to detect SQL injection vulnerabilities. The core concept of their approach is to 
generate test cases using genetic algorithm to inject in SQL queries. They defined two 
kinds of functions to generate test cases for different scenarios of SQL injection. But, their 
presented work has many shortcomings. First of all, the grammar used to generate the test 
cases is too limited which can only generate specific type and limited number of test cases 
and can easily miss the critical injection exploits. Secondly, the underlying important 
details of the genetic adaptation is missing or too brief, for example how the individuals 
are represented and population is generated, and how the genetic operators (crossover and 
mutation) are carried out. Finally, the empirical evaluation is conducted on only a single 
system which is not enough to conclude the credibility of the presented approach. 
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Table 1: Summary of Literature Survey 
Paper Focus Main Idea 
Y. W. Huang [7, 19] Detection and 
Prevention 
Automatic detection of vulnerabilities 
and employing runtime guards to 
vulnerable code in order to avoid 
exploitation of vulnerabilities. 
N. Jovanovic [8] Automated Detection of 
XSS 
Automatic detection of XSS 
vulnerabilities using taint analysis, 
and generate the exploit scenarios 
T. Pietraszek [14] Detection and 
Prevention of SQL 
Injection 
Uses ad-hoc serialization of user input 
to avoid SQL Injection attacks 
W.G.J. Halfond [9] Automated Detection of 
SQL Injection 
Automated technique to protect the 
web applications against SQL 
injection vulnerabilities, the 
technique is based on positive taint 
analysis and syntax aware evaluation. 
D. Scott and R. Sharp 
[23] 
Preventive Approach to 
Avoid Vulnerabilities 
Suggested to use proxy servers and 
data filters to monitor the information 
exchanged between client and server 
and by pass the suspicious 
information. 
Z. Su and G. 
Wassermann [24] 
Preventive Approach to 
Avoid Vulnerabilities 
Proposed an approach to filter out the 
malicious data by using syntactic 
criterion; context free grammars and 
compiler parsing techniques 
O. Hallaraker and G. 
Vigna [15] 
Detection and 
Prevention of XSS 
Introduced an auditing system for the 
JavaScript’s interpreter for Mozilla 
web browser. In which they used and 
intrusion detection system (IDS) 
which detect exploitable execution of 
JavaScript operations, and the same 
time take appropriate counter-
measures to avoid from infringement 
against the browser’s security 
R. Akrout et al. [20] Detection of SQL 
Injection 
The proposed methodology based on 
black box analysis of the target 
application. The mechanism of their 
approach is they actually exploit the 
identified vulnerability in order to 
make it more accurate. 
I. Medeiros et al. [27] Automated Detection 
and Correction 
The proposed approach combined 
taint analysis which identify the 
potential security vulnerabilities, with 
data mining technique, which predicts 
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the existence of false positives in the 
identified vulnerabilities. 
Aziz et al. [29] Automated Detection of 
SQLI 
The core idea is to generate the SQL 
injection test cases using Genetic 
Algorithm. And inject the generated 
test cases in the SQL queries of 
application to detect SQL injection. 
S. Gupta et al. [16] XSS Detection and 
Prevention 
The proposed framework based on 
string comparison and context aware 
sanitization of JavaScript. The 
framework is integrated inside the 
browser and compares the scripts 
embedded in the hypertext transfer 
protocol (HTTP) request and 
response to identify any malicious or 
untrusted JavaScript code. 
M. Alenezi et al. [17] SQL injection Detection They applied different existing 
approaches to identify SQL injection 
vulnerabilities and figure out the 
primary reasons of SQL injection 
vulnerabilities. On the basis of their 
findings they proposed two 
suggestions, first to select suitable 
open source application according to 
their give guidelines. Second the 
development of a secure 
programming framework within the 
organization. 
N. M. Vithanage et 
al. [21] 
Multiple Vulnerabilities 
Detection 
Two new approaches have been 
proposed in this paper to detect 
different types of vulnerabilities and 
already existing approaches have 
been highly modified in order to 
enhance the performance of the 
system. On completion of the tests, a 
report is generated along with a user 
friendly graphical overview of the 
detected vulnerabilities which can 
accordingly be used to find in detailed 
information regarding the executed 
attacks 
S. Cho et al. [18] SQL injection Detection The author presented a runtime 
validation and security enforcement 
approach to prevent from security 
vulnerabilities. The proposed 
approach can work with the web 
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applications developed in Java server 
pages (JSP). The approach enforces 
the verification of input values using 
static bytecode instrumentation at 
runtime 
H. Zhang et al. [26] SQL injection Detection Author presented an accurate and 
practical prevention approach for 
SQL injection vulnerabilities. Their 
approach based on taint analysis and 
mark the trusted sensitive data into 
extended utf-8 encodings 
The Proposed 
Approach 
Automated Detection 
and Correction of 
Security Vulnerabilities 
Automated detection and correction 
of security vulnerabilities in web 
applications. Genetic approach would 
be used to automatically generate 
exploits for vulnerable queries to 
detect SQLI. And the detected 
vulnerable queries are corrected using 
refactoring technique. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
GENETIC APPROACH TO DETECT SQL INJECTION 
4.1 Approach Overview 
To tackle the SQL injection problem or at least circumvent it we proposed genetic 
approach, which comprises of two following process. 
 Preliminary scanning to identify malicious queries in the given source code. 
 SQL Attack/Scenarios generation: we used genetic algorithm to generate SQL 
injection attack for the malicious queries identified in previous step. 
Figure 2. illustrate the general structure of our adopted approach and more details are 
provided in the following sections. 
4.2 Preliminary Scanning Process 
In this step, malicious queries those seems vulnerable to SQL injection attacks are 
identified and stored in an array data structure. The identification step takes the path of file 
or directory of sources code to scan for malicious queries that exists on the system. If the 
given file or directory path is an invalid path then, the process will terminate with an error 
message. If the give path is a valid path then, the algorithm will check if it’s a file or 
directory. If it’s a file, then the algorithm will read the file line by line and look for 
malicious queries. To mark a query as malicious we have used certain rules those are as 
follow.  
32 
 
 
Figure 6. Approach Overview 
 
Figure 7. Queries with where clauses 
 
Figure 8. Insert query with un-sanitized input 
 The query should be one of these: SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE, INSERT. 
 The query must have a WHERE clause in it, except in INSERT case as shown in 
Figure 7. 
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 The query must be using un-sanitized user input to store the details in INSERT case 
and in WHERE clause for other cases. As shown in Figure 8. 
If any query fulfills the above rule it will be stored in an array for next process. In the case 
of a directory path, the algorithm will loop through all valid source code files in the given 
directory and will apply the same process as described for file to collect all malicious 
queries from that directory, as shown in Figure 6. 
4.3 Genetic Approach to Generate SQL Attack/Scenarios 
After collecting all malicious queries in the given directory or file the next process is to 
verify the maliciousness of the collected queries by generating the SQL injection attacks 
using genetic algorithm. The following section describes the adaptation of genetic 
algorithm (GA), used to generate SQL injection attacks. To apply GA to a specific problem, 
its following main steps have to be described according to that particular problem: 
 Individual Encoding/Representation, 
 Generation of population from individuals,  
 Fitness function definition, to evaluate the individuals in population for their ability 
to solve the problem, 
 Individuals selection to transmit to new generation, 
 Production of new individuals using genetic operators (mutation and crossover), 
 Production of new population. 
The next sections comprehensively explain the adaptation of the design of these elements 
for the automatic generation of SQL injection attacks using GA. 
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Algorithm: SQLInjectionDetection 
Input: 
Q = Set of malicious queries 
Process: 
1.  I = exploits_set (individual_size) 
2.  P = set_of (I) 
3.  Initial_population (P, population_size) 
4.  for all queries in Q 
5.  While (Fitness < MaxFitness OR NumOfIterations = threshold) 
6.  For all I in P do 
7.  generate_query = decode_exploits(I) 
8.  fitness (I) = execute_query(generated_query) 
9.  end for 
10.  P = new_population(P) 
11.  end while 
12.  attack_scnarios = array (query => best_fitness(I)) 
13.  end for 
14.  return attack_scnarios 
Output: 
Set of SQL injection attack/scenario 
Figure 9. High Level Pseudo Code of Adopted Genetic Algorithm 
4.3.1 Genetic Algorithm Overview and Adaptation 
A high level pseudo code of genetic algorithm (GA) to generate SQL injection attack is 
illustrated in Figure 9. As the pseudo code describes the algorithm takes as input a set of 
malicious queries vulnerable to SQL injection attacks, and returns a generated attack for 
each corresponding query. Line 1 generates the individual of given size by randomly 
selecting the exploits from exploit set. From line 2-3 a population is generated and 
initialized with the give size of population from the set of individuals generated in previous 
step. Line 4 applies a for loop on all queries in the array given to the algorithm as input to 
generate SQL injection attacks. From line 5 to 11 encode a while loop with termination 
conditions, the while loop will carry out the actual genetic functions: fitness calculation, 
crossover, mutation and new population generation until it found the most fitted solution 
or certain number of iterations are completed. Inside the while loop on line 6 there is a for 
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loop which will iterates all individuals in the current population, and during each iteration 
the algorithm will decode the individual and generate an exploitable query by appending 
the decoded individual with the query. And once the query is generated, it will be executed 
to evaluate its fitness. Once the fitness is being calculated for all the individuals in current 
population the algorithm will perform the genetic operators: crossover and mutation and 
will generate new population. by the end of the execution of algorithm we will have a SQL 
Injection attack generated for the identified vulnerable queries.  
In the following few sections we will describe our adaptation of Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
to SQL Injection detection problem more precisely. 
4.3.1.1. Individual representation 
In our adaptation of GA, the individuals are derived from a set of exploit strings, which is 
constructed by taking the examples from [30] and [31], as discussed in sub section 2.2. 
SQL Injection attacks by examples of chapter 2. Each gene can either be an operator, 
operand or a string value. In our algorithm genes are represented as array data structure as 
shown in Figure 10. Next, algorithm will randomly choose an element from the exploit 
string’s set (e.g. OR, AND, 1 etc.) and will add it to individual gene. 
 
Figure 10. Individual Representation 
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The key idea behind encoding the exploit strings as array is that, when we will be 
calculating the fitness of an individual we will convert them to string and will append with 
the query as query string. The size of individual is dynamic and we can set it to an 
appropriate length. 
4.3.1.2. Generation of Initial Population 
To generate initial population, we start by defining the size of the population. The 
algorithm will take the population size and generate the population of individuals. The 
individuals will be generated by picking genes from exploit strings set randomly and will 
assigned to population. Each individual in the population will be representing an attack 
scenario for SQLI. Furthermore, it’s important to note that all individuals in the population 
initially have zero fitness value. Figure 11 is showing the initial population of five 
individuals all containing different combinations of exploit strings. 
 
Figure 11. Initial Population 
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4.3.1.3. Genetic Operators 
Selection: To select the individuals for genetic operators, there are different selection 
approaches available e.g. Roulette Wheel Selection, Elitism Selection, Rank Selection, 
Stochastic Universal Sampling and Tournament Selection etc. In Roulette Wheel Selection 
the probability of an individual to be selected in next population is proportional to its 
fitness, high fitness means high chances of being selected [32]. The drawback of this 
method is that, the chances of algorithm being stuck to local optimum solution are high. In 
other words, Roulette Wheel Selection will reduce the mutation properties and limit the 
selection pool for the algorithm, hence we are negligently limiting its potential to optimal 
solution. Other famous selection method is Tournament selection were we select x random 
individuals and pick the best one among them. This approach provides diversity in the 
population and the chances of algorithm being stuck in local optimum solution are low. 
That is why we have selected this selection method in our adaptation. 
Crossover: crossover on individuals of population is performed by using the selection 
criteria as described in section 4.3.1.3. Next, the algorithm will apply the crossover 
operation on the selected individuals and will swap their genes according to the given 
crossover rate. Thus, by applying the crossover function will have two new offspring 
inheriting the genes from two parent individuals as represented in Figure 12. Varying the 
crossover rate can alter the performance of genetic algorithm further details about the 
crossover rate we have used is provided in Table 5. 
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Figure 12. Crossover Operation 
Mutation: Unlike to crossover operation, mutation operation is performed on a single 
individual. The algorithm will pick a gene from the given individual and will change it 
randomly with any element taken from exploit strings set according to the given mutation 
rate. Figure 13 is showing that, how the mutation operation changes the gene of an 
individual which can have different behavior. Just like crossover rate mutation rate can also 
vary the performance of genetic algorithm and more details about the mutation rate we 
used in our approach are presented in Table 5. 
 
Figure 13. Mutation Operation 
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4.3.1.4. Fitness Function 
The fitness function is the most crucial part of the GA, also considered as the heart of GA. 
Fitness function actually guides the GA towards solution. The quality of the solution 
generated by GA is very dependent on its evaluation (fitness) function. The development 
of an efficient fitness function is very much dependent on the type of individuals and the 
problem we are dealing with. To evaluate the fitness of an individual, we have formulated 
the following fitness function. 
𝑭𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 =  
𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔
𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒖𝒂𝒍 + 𝟏
 
Each gene of an individual will be decoded into a string which will formulate an exploit 
and we will append it with the given query to execute. And at the last all the genes of the 
current individual will be combined by appending blank spaces in between their genes to 
formulate another kind of exploit and it will also be injected to the query. Following image 
will explain the idea.  
 
Figure 14 Generated Exploits from and Individual 
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For example, we have an individual as represented in Figure 10, we will create 5 different 
exploits from it as represented in Figure 14 and will add them to the user input variable 
which $id in the above example. If any of the created exploit work we will add 1 to the 
current fitness of the individual, after evaluating all the 5 exploits we will take the ratio and 
check the fitness. Maximum fitness could be 1 which means all the generated exploits 
worked and we have generated maximum exploits for a single query in an individual and 
minimum fitness could be zero which means none of the created exploit worked. 
4.4 Correction of Detected SQL Injections  
To avoid SQL injection in web applications many recommendations are provided by the 
industry professionals and in the literature [6, 31, 33, 34]. One of the most recommended 
approach for specifically PHP web applications is to use PDO classes instead of native 
SQL functions and sanitize the user input by binding them in PDO bind parameters. But 
most of the recommendations can be followed by the time of initial development of the 
application. In order to mitigate the SQL injection vulnerabilities in existing source code 
refactoring is a popular approach. Refactoring is the art of improving the existing code. 
Refactoring provides us with ways to recognize problematic code and gives us recipes for 
improving it [35]. We will describe the SQL injection prevention recommendations briefly 
in the following section and then we will describe the details how we utilized them to 
refactor the vulnerable code. 
To mitigate from SQL injection attacks, the software tester and developers should handle 
the user inputs carefully because the user inputs are the potential weak links which could 
be exploited by attackers to harm the application. Not only precautions should be 
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implemented but also the user input should be validated according to the following 
recommendations [33] given in Table 2. 
Table 2. User input validation recommendations 
No. Validation Recommendation 
1 
Always validate the user input’s type, size along with contents and do not leave 
it on assumptions. 
2 Verify the string variable’s content. 
3 
Only accept the expected input values, and reject all vulnerable strings like 
binary value and comment characters. 
4 Enforce suitable limits on the size and value type of user input. 
5 
The programmers should avoid the build transactions SQL queries from user 
input directly. 
7 Use stored procedures to validate user input. 
8 Without validation do not concatenate user input with queries. 
In addition to the above mentioned recommendations there are few more provided by 
OWASP [6] and are described in Table 3.  
Table 3. OWASP Recommendations for SQLI prevention. 
No. Validation Recommendation 
1 Use Parameterized Queries instead of plain and simple Queries. 
2 Validate user input 
3 Escape all user input. 
4 Enforce least privileges to database users 
5 White list input validation 
6 Configure error reporting 
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As described before in this section that most of the suggestions can be practiced by the 
time of initial design and development of the applications. Some of the suggestions are 
related to the configurations for example, suggestion number 4 in Table 3 “Enforce least 
privileges to database users” is a configuration setting. It means that, the regular users 
should be given minimum permissions to perform database operations. And suggestion 
number 6 in Table 3 “Configure error reporting” is also a configuration setting which 
means the database administrators should enable the error reporting and should log all the 
activities performed on database in order to track any suspicious activity or user which may 
cause harm to the database. Especially the database logs provide a great help and insights 
about the user accessing and performing operations on database. In the following section, 
we will describe some of the implementable suggestions with refactoring approach to 
mitigate SQL injection vulnerabilities in existing source code. 
4.4.1 Validate User Input 
By applying certain validation and filtering rules on the user input we can avoid SQL 
injection attacks for example filtering the SQL keywords (insert, select, and, or, etc.) from 
the user supplied input can prevent SQL injection attacks. We developed a function to filter 
and validate the user input which is described below in Figure 15. The main objective of 
the function is to take the user input and purify if from malicious characters. we have stored 
almost all possible keywords in an array, the function will iteratively check those keywords 
in user input and it will return false if user input will contain any of them.  
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Algorithm: FilterUserInput 
Input: 
I = User Input 
Process: 
 Function FilterUserInput ($input) 
{ 
filter_words = array (insert, delete, update, select, and, exec, mid, 
master, or, truncate, declare, union, join, char) 
if ($input == null) 
{ 
return false; 
} 
foreach ($input as $keyword) 
{ 
If (strops(strtolower($input), strtolower($keyword))) 
{ 
return true; 
} 
} 
return false; 
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Output: 
Boolean value, either the input contains any reserve word or not. 
Figure 15. Algorithm to filter user input 
 
4.4.2 Escape all User Input 
It’s very important to just not filter all the user supplied input. There are few characters 
those are legitimate to use but can be used with wrong intentions and can help in SQL 
injection, for example single quote (‘), double quote (“”) etc. These characters must be 
escaped before appending them with SQL queries. Some languages also provide built in 
functions for escaping the user input for example in PHP the function 
“mysql_real_escape_string()” is used to escape invalid characters. We define a custom 
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function for escaping the user input, a complete list of escape characters and the function 
definition is give in Figure 16. 
Algorithm: EscapeUserInput 
Input: 
I = User Input 
Process: 
 Function EscapeUserInput ($input) 
{ 
if (! empty($input) && is_string($input))  
{  
return str_replace (array ('\\', "\0", "\n", "\r", "'", '"', "\x1a"), 
array ('\\\\', '\\0', '\\n', '\\r', "\\'", '\\"', '\\Z'), $input);  
}  
return $input; 
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Output: 
Input string after replacing the characters. 
Figure 16. Escape User Input Function 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Design of Experimental Setup 
To implement our described approach in section 4 and to evaluate it empirically on real 
time source code we developed a tool using PHP language. We used object oriented 
programing paradigm to develop our tool and developed different classes for all different 
GA processes. To generate and initialize individuals we developed an individual class 
which performs all individuals related operations. General functions of individual class are, 
generate individual, get specific gene and get fitness of the specified individual. After that, 
we developed a population class whose general functions are: generate population, get 
fittest individual, sort population, get individual and save individual. And then we 
developed the fitness class whose sole function is to calculate the fitness of the individuals 
using our designed fitness function which is described in section 4.3.1.4. And finally 
created an algorithm class which has the genetic operation, crossover, mutation and evolve 
population functions. To conduct the experiments, we collected open source projects from 
internet, these projects are publically available and are provided with known vulnerabilities 
for testing purposes. Along with these open source projects we also used some other custom 
developed source code for testing. All the experiments are being performed on a core i5 
machine with 4 GB of RAM and running windows operating system. In following section, 
we will further describe about the systems used to carry out experiments and the research 
questions designed to answer with the help of experimental results. 
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5.1.1 Research Questions 
In order to access the performance, applicability, usefulness and comparison of our genetic 
approach with existing SQLI detection techniques we defined following research 
questions. 
RQ1. What percentage of SQL Injection vulnerabilities the proposed approach can detect, 
that would otherwise go undetected? 
RQ2. What percentage of legitimate queries are incorrectly identified by genetic 
approach as vulnerable? 
RQ3. How does the proposed approach performs as compared to existing SQL Injection 
detection techniques/tools?  
RQ4. How successfully our approach refactored the vulnerable code to mitigate the SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. 
Table 4. Vulnerable Applications Used for Empirical Evaluation 
Systems Number of Files Number of Vulnerabilities 
Bricks 61 9 
bWAPP 285 20 
Damn Vulnerable Web 
Application (DVWA) 
550 33 
XVWA 704 27 
Twitterlike 60 9 
Peruggia 15 27 
WackoPicko 129 114 
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5.1.2 Studied Systems 
To empirically evaluate our presented approach, we considered extensive open source 
projects those are available at [36] and are known to have certain types of vulnerabilities. 
Table 4 is presenting the systems used for experimental evaluations, the first system is 
Bricks1 which is a web application developed in PHP and MySQL for learning and practice 
the security vulnerabilities in web applications. The system concentrates on varieties of 
usually observed application security vulnerabilities. Every "Block" has some kind of 
security issue which can be exploit manually or by using some automated program. 
Similarly, the second system presented in the table is buggy web application (bWAPP)2 is 
also an application with vulnerabilities deliberately embedded in it. The key objective is to 
aid the systems engineers, security enthusiast, students and developers to identify and 
secure the web applications. In the same way, all other applications mentioned in the table: 
Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA)3, Hackademic Challenges Project4, 
Mutillidae5, Peruggia6, and WackoPicko7 all these applications are developed with known 
vulnerabilities and free and open source for testing the detection of vulnerabilities. one 
important thing to mentions here is, there is no standard benchmark available for SQL 
injection testing so we selected the best available options. Other thing is the application’s 
details presented in Table 4 are known to have various SQL injection vulnerabilities but 
the firm number about how many SQL injection vulnerabilities are present in those 
                                                 
1 http://sechow.com/bricks/index.html 
2 http://itsecgames.blogspot.be/ 
3 http://www.dvwa.co.uk/ 
4 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Hackademic_Challenges_Project 
5 http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=mutillidae/mutillidae-deliberately-vulnerable-php-owasp-top-10 
6 https://sourceforge.net/projects/peruggia/ 
7 https://github.com/adamdoupe/WackoPicko 
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applications are not available. So we first manually identified the SQL injection 
vulnerabilities in those applications to get some estimated numbers. 
5.1.3 Genetic Parameters setting and tuning 
Table 5. Genetic parameters with their values 
Parameter Value 
Population Size 50 
Mutation Rate 10% 
Crossover Rate 90% 
Selection Method Tournament Selection 
Pool Size 25 
Number of Iterations 30 
 
5.2 Results and Analysis 
In this section we will present the experiments conducted on source code of different files 
and projects. Each experiment is repeated at least three times to ensure the output and to 
reduce the error. 
5.2.1 Results for RQ1 
Table 6 is presenting the RQ1’s answer which is, what percentage of SQL Injection 
vulnerabilities the proposed approach can detect, that would otherwise go undetected? 
Other research questions will describe the comparison and usefulness of our approach and 
this research question is showing the efficiency of our genetic approach. The Table 6 is 
showing the system names in first column and their respective total SQL injection 
vulnerabilities in second column and finally the third column is representing the SQL 
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injection vulnerabilities detected by our genetic approach. It is clear from the Table 6 that 
our genetic approach detected most of the SQL injection vulnerabilities. Along with 
detection results some of the examples of vulnerable queries generated by our genetic 
approach are presented in Figure 17. 
Table 6. Detected number of SQL injections by genetic approach 
System Total SQLI Detected 
Bricks 9 10 
bWapp 20 19 
DVWA 33 35 
XVWA 27 30 
Twitterlike 9 9 
Peruggia 27 25 
WackoPicko 114 118 
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Figure 17. Examples of Malicious queries detected by genetic approach  
5.2.2 Results for RQ2 
Our second research question which “what percentage of legitimate queries are incorrectly 
identified by genetic approach as vulnerable?” is aim to validate the correctness and 
accuracy of our genitive approach. We have presented false positives and false negatives 
analysis generated by our genetic approach. In Table 7 the results for false positive and 
false negatives are shown, first three columns are same as Table 6 which are the systems 
used, total SQL injection vulnerabilities in that system and the detected number of 
vulnerable while the fourth column is showing the false positives which means the 
vulnerabilities those were wrongly detected as vulnerabilities and fifth columns is showing 
the false negatives which means our approach missed few vulnerabilities. 
Table 7. False positives and false negatives in genetic approach 
System Total SQLI Detected False Positive False Negative 
Bricks 9 10 1 0 
bWapp 20 19 0 1 
DVWA 33 35 2 0 
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XVWA 27 30 3 0 
Twitterlike 9 9 0 0 
Peruggia 27 25 0 2 
WackoPicko 114 118 4 0 
 
 
Figure 18. SQLI detected by genetic approach with false positives and false negatives 
Along with tabular representation of results for second research question we have also 
presented them graphically in Figure 18. 
5.2.3 Results for RQ3 
In this section we will provide a comparative analysis of our genetic approach against RIPs 
which will answer our third research question “how does the proposed approach performs 
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as compared to existing SQL Injection detection techniques/tools?”. RIPs is a famous static 
code analysis tool which can also detect SQL injection vulnerabilities in source code. 
In this comparison analysis we did not just presented the total number of vulnerabilities 
detected by each approach but we also provided the false positives and false negatives 
analysis to better understand the overall accuracy. Table 8 is presenting the comparative 
analysis results first two columns are same as we shown in previous results, systems and 
their total vulnerabilities. the third column, is the total detected vulnerabilities by genetic 
approach fourth and fifth columns are showing the false positives and false negatives 
respectively. Sixth column is showing the total SQL injection vulnerabilities detected by 
RIPs. Seventh and eighth columns are showing the false positives and false negatives 
respectively generated by RIPs. False positives and false negatives for both our genetic 
approach and RIPs are graphically illustrated in graphs in Figure 19 and Figure 20. From 
both the tabular and graphical results, we can conclude that the genetic approach performed 
more efficiently as compared to RIPs. Genetic approach detected the SQL injection 
vulnerabilities more accurately and produced lesser false positives and false negatives as 
compared to RIPs. 
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Table 8. Comparison between Genetic Approach and RIPs 
System Total 
SQLI 
Detected 
by GA 
GA 
FP’s 
GA 
FN’s 
RIPS RIPS 
FP’s 
RIPS 
FN’s 
Bricks 9 10 1 0 9 0 2 
bWapp 20 19 0 1 22 2 0 
DVWA 33 35 2 0 35 2 3 
XVWA 27 30 3 0 33 6 1 
Twitterlike 9 9 0 0 9 0 0 
Peruggia 27 25 0 2 30 3 1 
WackoPicko 114 118 4 0 120 6 9 
 
 
Figure 19. False positives comparison between Genetic Approach and RIPs 
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Figure 20. False negatives comparison between genetic approach and RIPs 
5.2.4 Results for RQ4 
After successful and efficient detection of SQL injection vulnerabilities the next challenge 
is to fix them, in this section we will answer our fourth research question “how successfully 
our approach refactored the vulnerable code to mitigate the SQL injection vulnerabilities?” 
to illustrate how easily and correctly we have fixed the SQL injection vulnerabilities using 
refactoring approach. 
Automated Refactoring is very useful to correct problematic code automatically which is 
a laborious and time consuming job otherwise. We have defined two function to filter and 
escape the user supplied input and the details are provided in section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. we 
then applied those functions to the detected SQL injection queries and the results are given 
in Table 9. The fourth column in Table 9 is showing the number of refactored SQL injection 
vulnerabilities. we achieved these good results for refactoring because we have done the 
hard part in previous step in identifying the injection vulnerabilities. so in mitigation step 
we just have to apply the described filtering functions. 
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Table 9. Refactored SQL injection Vulnerabilities 
System Total SQLI Detected Refactored 
Bricks 9 10 10 
bWapp 20 19 19 
DVWA 33 35 35 
XVWA 27 30 30 
Twitterlike 9 9 9 
Peruggia 27 25 25 
WackoPicko 114 118 118 
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6 CHAPTER 6 
GENETIC APPROACH TO DETECT CROSS SITE 
SCRIPTING (XSS) 
6.1 Approach Overview 
Intended behavior of any software application is the most important objective of traditional 
software testing approaches [37]. The attain this essential objective different scenarios and 
use cases are applied on the software. In this research, we extended this concept and applied 
it to web application’s security testing. By forcing the source code of an application through 
different control flow paths we identified that either if any path in the given source code is 
vulnerable to cross site scripting. There is possibility that a certain control flow path is 
vulnerable to cross site scripting while the other one is safe. The control flow path will be 
considered vulnerable if it will be executed in response to user input without any prior 
validation and sanitization. To tackle the Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities or at least 
circumvent them we proposed path coverage approach by generating test data using genetic 
algorithm to validate control flow paths in the source code. The core idea of our approach 
is to first identify the sensitive sinks also called vulnerable paths in the source code and 
generate test data for the identified vulnerable control flow paths using genetic algorithms. 
The primary aim of our proposed approach along with cross site scripting vulnerabilities 
detection is that, to leverage the test data generation by automatically generating the test 
data for multiple path coverage using genetic algorithm. We formulized the test data 
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generation problem as a search optimization problem and devised genetic algorithm 
accordingly to generate multiple test data for multiple path coverage in one run. Typically, 
it’s not possible to cover all control flow paths for various reasons [38], our aim is to 
identify maximum cross site scripting vulnerabilities by minimal number of test data. The 
two principle reasons that contribute to infeasibility of covering all paths in a source code 
are. 
 If a program has loops it may contain an infinite number of control flow paths. 
 In a program number of branches produces multiple paths, and the paths are 
exponential to the number of branches. There is possibility that many of the paths 
are infeasible. 
On these grounds, the path testing problem become an NP complete problem and making 
the coverage of all potential paths challenging [39]. Generally, a subset of paths of interest 
is selected by testers to cover with test data. Our interest here is to cover a subset of paths 
and vulnerable paths whose execution may lead to potential cross site scripting attacks. It 
is important to mention here that; the cross site scripting will be accounted whenever a 
variable or user input is used in a sensitive sink. 
We selected genetic algorithms to generate test data due its proven capability of generating 
test data for conventional programs [38]. Genetic algorithm is very limitedly used for web 
security testing, an application of GA is provided by Avancini and Ceccato [40] but their 
work has some shortcomings. They only considered reflected cross site scripting type of 
vulnerabilities and not others. Their work also lacks in extensive experimentation, they 
presented very limited number of experiments with limited settings of genetic algorithm 
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used specially the mutation. To address these shortcomings, we proposed the genetic 
approach to generate test data for path flow problem to detect cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities. We actually combined two approaches; static code analysis and genetic 
approach for test data generation to make the detection process more efficient. The 
proposed approach is comprising of two steps. 
 Preliminary static code analysis to identify the sensitive sinks in source code. 
 Genetic approach to generate test data for the verification of path flows to exploits 
sensitive sink identified in previous step. 
The complete overview of our two step approach is shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Proposed approach for XSS vulnerabilities detection. 
6.2 Preliminary Scanning Process 
The process of cross site scripting vulnerabilities detection starts with static analysis also 
called taint analysis of source code. The concept of static analysis was initially proposed 
by B. Chess and J. West [41] to leverage the manual inspection for vulnerabilities. Taint 
analysis tracks the tainted or untainted status of variables throughout the source code 
control flow. Whenever a variable is used in a sensitive sink its reported as vulnerable taint 
analysis has been mostly used for missing or inadequate user input validation which results 
in cross site scripting [10, 42]. To perform taint analysis of source code we used RIPs [43] 
60 
 
in our work. RIPs is a static code analysis tool which is capable of detection of various 
kinds of vulnerabilities including cross site scripting vulnerabilities. RIPs takes a directory 
or an individual files path to perform static analysis and provides statistical report about 
the vulnerable points in the code. If the give input is a directory not a single file it can 
recursively scan all the files and sub directories in the given input directory. It is worth 
mentioning here that the RIPs can generate false positives, that means it can indicate a flow 
path as vulnerable but in fact that path is not vulnerable. So we use genetic algorithm to 
generate test data and enforce the program to go through all the possible flow paths to 
verify if they are indeed vulnerable or not. 
6.3 Genetic Algorithm for XSS Detection 
The general details about genetic algorithm has already been discussed in earlier chapter 
2.4. We will describe here the specific details and formulation of the cross site scripting 
test data generation using genetic algorithm and high level pseudo code is shown in Figure 
22. The underlying stages and steps will remain same and those are: 
 Individual Encoding/Representation, 
 Generation of population from individuals,  
 Fitness function definition, to evaluate the individuals in population for their ability 
to solve the problem, 
 Individuals selection to transmit to new generation, 
 Production of new individuals using genetic operators (mutation and crossover),  
 Production of new population. 
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Before going into details of each step it’s important to mention here that we made a 
database of cross site scripting attack patters by collecting different patterns from different 
resources available on internet[44, 45]. The database can be updated with new cross site 
scripting attack patters as they emerged with time, they can be simply added to the 
database. The purpose to use these attack patterns is to assist the genetic algorithm in the 
generation of adequate test data to reveal cross site scripting vulnerabilities. Genetic 
algorithm produces permutations and combinations of these attack patterns to generate 
inputs for the source code to enforce it to execute certain control flow paths. 
 
Figure 22. Genetic algorithm for path testing. 
6.3.1. Individual representation 
The common practice to represent individuals is using the binary strings, but it is 
sometimes problem specific and should be used accordingly.  In our adaptation of GA, the 
individuals are derived from cross site scripting database, which is constructed by 
collecting attack patterns from different resources on internet [44, 45]. Individuals are 
formulated to represent the parameter values; each gene would represent a value or an 
attack pattern. In our algorithm genes are represented as array data structure as shown in 
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Figure 23. Next, algorithm will randomly choose an element from the XSS attack database 
and will add it to individual gene. 
 
Figure 23. XSS individuals Representation 
The key idea behind encoding the XSS attack patterns as array is that, when we will be 
calculating the fitness of an individual we will provide them as parameter values to the 
source code under XSS vulnerabilities testing. The size of individual is dynamic and we 
can set it to an appropriate length. 
6.3.2. Generation of Initial Population 
To generate initial population, we start by defining the size of the population. The 
algorithm will take the population size and generate the population of individuals. The 
individuals will be generated by picking genes from XSS attack database randomly and 
will assigned to population. Each individual in the population will be representing some 
parameter values and an attack scenario. Furthermore, it’s important to note that all 
individuals in the population initially have zero fitness value. In initial population all 
individuals will be containing different combinations of parameter values and attack 
scenario. 
6.3.3. Genetic Operators 
Selection: To select the individuals for genetic operators, there are different selection 
approaches available e.g. Roulette Wheel Selection, Elitism Selection, Rank Selection, 
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Stochastic Universal Sampling and Tournament Selection etc. In Roulette Wheel Selection 
the probability of an individual to be selected in next population is proportional to its 
fitness, high fitness means high chances of being selected [32]. The drawback of this 
method is that, the chances of algorithm being stuck to local optimum solution are high. In 
other words, Roulette Wheel Selection will reduce the mutation properties and limit the 
selection pool for the algorithm, hence we are negligently limiting its potential to optimal 
solution. Other famous selection method is Tournament selection were we select x random 
individuals and pick the best one among them. This approach provides diversity in the 
population and the chances of algorithm being stuck in local optimum solution are low. 
That is why we have selected this selection method in our adaptation. 
Crossover: crossover on individuals of population is performed by using the selection 
criteria as described in previous section4.3.1.3. Next, the algorithm will apply the crossover 
operation on the selected individuals and will swap their genes according to the given 
crossover rate. Thus, by applying the crossover function will have two new offspring 
inheriting the genes from two parent individuals as represented in Figure 24. Varying the 
crossover rate can alter the performance of genetic algorithm further details about the 
crossover rate we have used is provided in Table 5. 
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Figure 24. Crossover Operation 
Mutation: Unlike to crossover operation, mutation operation is performed on a single 
individual. The algorithm will pick a gene from the given individual and will change it 
randomly with any element taken from XSS attack database according to the given 
mutation rate. Figure 25 is showing that, how the mutation operation changes the gene of 
an individual which can have different behavior. Just like crossover rate mutation rate can 
also vary the performance of genetic algorithm and more details about the mutation rate 
we used in our approach are presented in Table 5. 
 
Figure 25. Mutation Operation 
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6.3.4. Fitness Function 
The fitness function is the most crucial part of the GA, also considered as the heart of GA. 
Fitness function actually guides the GA towards solution. The quality of the solution 
generated by GA is very dependent on its evaluation (fitness) function. The development 
of an efficient fitness function is very much dependent on the type of individuals and the 
problem we are dealing with. To evaluate the fitness of an individual, we considered 
multiple objectives and consider it as a maximization problem. The first objective we 
consider to maximize for control flow path testing to detect cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities is, number of branches covered in a vulnerable path. Our objective is to 
uncover maximum number of branches in a path that leads to a sensitive sink. For example, 
if a path has seven branches in it our aim is to discover them all and if an individual discover 
them all we will assign it the maximum fitness which is 1. If the individual only able to 
discover 3 of them, we will assign it the fitness equals to 0.43. We formulated the following 
equation for branches discovery. 
𝑭𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 =  
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝑩𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒔
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒉
 
Other objective we considered for path coverage is to generate different attack scenarios 
available in attack patterns database for a single path. We will keep track of each attack 
that is successful for a particular path. Along with that the importance of an attack scenario 
will be increased for that particular path for which it has successfully uncovered the 
sensitive sink. 
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7 CHAPTER 7 
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
7.1 Design of Experimental Setup and Research Questions 
To implement our test data generator for XSS vulnerabilities detection described in section 
6 and to evaluate it empirically on real time source code we implemented it in PHP 
language. We are interested in detection of cross site scripting in PHP applications the 
reason is that, PHP has a large share in currently active web applications over internet and 
is more prone to vulnerabilities. The reason of implementing our approach in PHP is, so 
we can execute the source code under testing in the same environment. We used object 
oriented programing paradigm to implement our genetic test data generator and developed 
different classes for all different GA processes. The architecture and underlying process is 
same as we described earlier in section 5.1. In addition to that, we developed some 
vulnerable source code to perform experiments. Finally, we have designed following 
research questions to answer with the results of our experiments. 
RQ1. Is the genetic approach capable of covering all the vulnerable paths to reach 
sensitive sinks? 
RQ2. How efficiently the genetic approach covered the branches in vulnerable 
paths? 
RQ3. Is the genetic approach capable of generating multiple attack scenarios for 
a single vulnerable path? 
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7.2 Login Page Experiment 
Login forms are very common in most of the modern web applications they require users 
to input some credentials and the application validates the user input. We designed a special 
kind of login form which asks the user to input his first name and last name then check if 
the user input contains any cross site scripting vulnerability, despite of basic check it’s still 
vulnerable to cross site scripting the login form is shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26. Simple Login Form 
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Figure 27. Login Form HTML 
 
The form will submit the user input details to another PHP script to process further which 
is shown in Figure 28. The method used in this form is POST method so the form handler 
will be able to get all the posted values in POST global array of PHP. 
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Figure 28. Action Script 
To apply genetic algorithm on this script to validate its path flows we first need to perform 
taint analysis on it and as we mentioned in earlier section that we have used RIPs to scan 
source code to identify the sensitive sinks in it.  
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Figure 29. Sensitive Sink No. 1 in Login Script. 
 
Figure 30. Sensitive Sink No. 2 in Login Script. 
RIPs identified two sensitive sinks in the given script as shown in Figure 29 and Figure 30 
respectively. The reason is because script is only checking for the patter “<script” in it and 
there are other patters as well those can successfully penetrate from this script for example 
“<img dynsrc="javascript:alert('XSS')">”. We converted this source code to control flow 
tree and formulated different paths of the code to reach sensitive sinks. The control flow 
tree is shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31. Control flow tree of login script. 
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By following the control flow tree shown in Figure 31. 12 paths generated those leads to 
sensitive sinks in the code and we will exploit them using attack scenarios generated by 
our proposed genetic approach. The generated vulnerable paths are shown in Figure 32.  
 
Figure 32. Vulnerable Paths in login script 
7.2.1 Results for Login Page Experiment 
In login page experiment we considered one control flow path at a time to apply attack 
scenarios on and to reach the sensitive sink. So, we loop through all the twelve control flow 
paths shown in Figure 32 one by one and tested them for cross site scripting vulnerabilities 
using attack scenarios generated by our genetic approach. We will explain the results and 
will try to answer our research questions we formulated in previous section.  
7.2.2 Results for RQ1 and RQ2 
The first two research questions are related to the performance of our genetic approach 
which concerns with, is the genetic approach capable of covering all or maximum number 
of paths and is the genetic approach capable of covering all or maximum number of 
branches in a given control flow path.  
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Table 10. Genetic Parameters and Their Values Used in Experiments. 
Parameter Value 
Population Size 40 
Mutation Rate 40% 
Crossover Rate 60% 
Selection Method Tournament Selection 
Pool Size 11 
Number of Iterations 30 
 
Table 11. Results for XSS RQ1 and RQ2. 
Paths No. of Branches Covered. 
No. of Generations to reach 
sensitive sink. 
1 6 4 
2 8 7 
3 7 10 
4 9 6 
5 7 8 
6 9 7 
7 8 5 
8 10 6 
9 8 11 
10 10 8 
11 9 10 
12 11 9 
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Table 11 is showing the results for control flow path testing using genetic algorithm. 
Column one in Table 11 is showing the path number and column is showing that either the 
genetic algorithm covered all the branches of a path under testing or not. And the third 
column is showing the number of generations genetic algorithm took to cover all the 
branches and to reach the sensitive sink in a given path. The results are showing that the 
genetic algorithm was able to traverse all the paths and have covered all their branches by 
successfully reaching to the sensitive sink by following that path. Finally, the results are 
also illustrating that the genetic algorithm did not took very large number of generations to 
cover all the branches in a path instead it emerged in a reasonable number of generations. 
7.2.3 Results for RQ3 
In our third research question we aim to show the ability of our genetic approach to generate 
multiple attack scenarios for a single control flow path.  
Table 12. Results for XSS RQ3. 
Paths 
No. of Branches 
Covered. 
No. of Generations 
to reach sensitive 
sink. 
No. of Attacks 
Generated. 
1 6 4 3 
2 8 7 5 
3 7 10 4 
4 9 6 5 
5 7 8 3 
6 9 7 5 
7 8 5 4 
8 10 6 6 
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9 8 11 3 
10 10 8 4 
11 9 10 5 
12 11 9 6 
 
7.3 Blog Comment Experiment 
Blog comments is another common example in modern web applications where different 
users can post their views and comments. Blog comments usually ask the users to provide 
their names and the comment text. We designed a special kind of blog comments form 
which asks the user to input his name and the comment text then check if the user input 
contains any cross site scripting vulnerability, despite of basic check it’s still vulnerable to 
cross site scripting the blog comment form is shown in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33. Comments Form 
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Figure 34. Comments Form HTML 
Figure 34. is showing the html code for blog comments example. The code is is displaying 
the comments form which contains two fields one for name and other for comments text. 
The comments html form will get the user input for name and comment text and it will post 
those values to another script to validate and store in the database. As we mentioned this is 
a special example so it is still vulnerable to XSS attacks and we can illustrate the stored 
XSS attack here. The action script to which the comment form will post the values is shown 
in the figure. Once the comments are saved into database they need to be shown on the 
page, we have developed the script to fetch and display the comments from database which 
is shown in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35. Comments Display 
The display comments script will bring all comments from the database and will show them 
on the html page. The script checks for only script keyword in only comments variable and 
which means it will allow other XSS patterns to penetrate through the script and they will 
become the part of the out when script will print user’s name and comment text. 
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Figure 36. Comment Action 
Figure 36. is showing the comments action script, the primary work on the action script 
here is to get the values posted from user for name and comments and save them in the 
database. The script is vulnerable for both XSS and SQL injection scripts because it is not 
sanitizing or validating the user provided inputs at all and directly embedding them in the 
SQL query. User could supply and SQL injection sequence which will be executed along 
with the original SQL query or user can supply an XSS attack patter which will be stored 
in the database and will be called whenever the restore methods is called. The XSS attack 
patter will reside in the database until the administrator delete it, which will result in Stored 
or Persistent type of XSS attack. Now, we need to identify the sensitive sinks in the given 
code for that purpose used RIPs and the identified sensitive sinks are shown in  
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Figure 37. Sensitive Sink 1 in Comments Script 
 
 
Figure 38. Sensitive Sink 2 in Comments Script 
RIPs identified two sensitive sinks in the given script as shown in Figure 37 and Figure 38 
respectively. The reason is because script is only checking for the pattern “<script” in the 
comments variable and there are other patterns as well those can successfully penetrate 
from this script for example “<body onload="javascript:alert('XSS')">”. We converted this 
source code to control flow tree and formulated different paths of the code to reach 
sensitive sinks. The control flow tree is shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 39. Comments Controll Flow 
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By following the control flow tree shown in Figure 39. 13 control flow paths generated 
those leads to sensitive sinks in the code and we will exploit them using attack scenarios 
generated by our proposed genetic approach. The generated vulnerable paths are shown in 
Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40. Comments Script Control Flow Paths 
7.3.1 Results for Blog Comment Experiment 
In blog comment experiment we considered one control flow path at a time to apply attack 
scenarios on and to reach the sensitive sink. So, we loop through all the thirteen control 
flow paths shown in Figure 40 one by one and tested them for cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities using attack scenarios generated by our genetic approach. We will explain 
the results and will try to answer our research questions we formulated in previous section.  
7.3.2 Results for RQ1 and RQ2 
The first two research questions are related to the performance of our genetic approach 
which concerns with, is the genetic approach capable of covering all or maximum number 
of paths and is the genetic approach capable of covering all or maximum number of 
branches in a given control flow path.  
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Table 13. Results for XSS RQ1 and RQ2 for Comments Experiment 
Paths No. of Branches Covered. 
No. of Generations to reach 
sensitive sink. 
1 15 7 
2 16 9 
3 16 8 
4 17 9 
5 16 7 
6 17 10 
7 17 11 
8 16 7 
9 17 8 
10 17 7 
11 18 10 
12 18 9 
13 19 8 
 
Table 13 is showing the results for control flow path testing using genetic algorithm. 
Column one in Table 13 is showing the path number and column two is showing that either 
the genetic algorithm covered all the branches of a path under testing or not. And the third 
column is showing the number of generations genetic algorithm took to cover all the 
branches and to reach the sensitive sink in a given path. The results are showing that the 
genetic algorithm was able to traverse all the paths and have covered all their branches by 
successfully reaching to the sensitive sink by following that path. Finally, the results are 
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also illustrating that the genetic algorithm did not took very large number of generations to 
cover all the branches in a path instead it emerged in a reasonable number of generations. 
7.3.3 Results for RQ3 
In our third research question we aim to show the ability of our genetic approach to generate 
multiple attack scenarios for a single control flow path.  
Table 14. Results for XSS RQ3 for Comments Experiment. 
Paths 
No. of Branches 
Covered. 
No. of Generations 
to reach sensitive 
sink. 
No. of Attacks 
Generated. 
1 15 7 5 
2 16 9 7 
3 16 8 6 
4 17 9 9 
5 16 7 9 
6 17 10 11 
7 17 11 8 
8 16 7 7 
9 17 8 12 
10 17 7 6 
11 18 10 5 
12 18 9 10 
13 19 8 12 
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Table 14 is basically showing the capability of genetic algorithm for generation of diverse 
and multiple XSS attack for a single path. The third column in Table 14 is showing that, 
how many XSS attacks the genetic algorithm generated for a particular control flow path. 
It is possible that a particular attack pattern is successful for a give control flow path but 
the other one is not so, it is important to verify a control flow path against multiple attack 
patterns so insure robust security against XSS vulnerabilities. furthermore, the multiple 
attacks generations can point out the weaknesses and the loop holes in the script which can 
be fixed to avoid attacks. 
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8 CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing our research contributions, strengths and 
limitations of the study, threats to validity and identifies possible areas for future research.  
8.2 Summary 
In this research work, we presented literature review to identify the most recurring and 
most dangerous security vulnerabilities in web applications. In our work, we consider two 
web security vulnerabilities, namely, SQL injection and cross site scripting.  SQL injection 
and cross site scripting security threats are considered as they are among top ten most 
recurring and dangerous vulnerabilities [6] for web applications. Furthermore, both 
security vulnerabilities have an economic impact to web applications especially application 
that are developed using loosely typed languages like PHP.  
We also presented an indicative literature review of existing approaches and techniques to 
detect and correct security vulnerabilities in web applications. Majority of existing 
approaches focus on detecting a single security vulnerability and do not provide auto 
correction mechanism. The summary of existing techniques and their short falls are 
presented in Section 3.  
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8.2.1 SQL Injection Detection and Correction 
In this thesis, we presented a formulation of web applications security testing as search 
optimization problem and used genetic algorithm to solve the resultant search optimization 
problem.  
First, to detect SQL injection vulnerabilities, we used static source code analysis with 
genetic algorithm. Static source code analysis is the first phase of our approach, which will 
identify the potential vulnerable SQL queries in the source code. Once the static analysis 
has complete its process and identified all the vulnerable queries in the source code, we 
apply genetic algorithm to generate attack scenarios for those queries.  
To start with genetic algorithm to generate attack scenario, we designed a set of exploit 
strings similar to other researchers [6, 31, 44]. The exploits consist of terminals, functions, 
behavior changing function and syntax repairing functions. We used these exploits to seed 
individual’s population in genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithm take randomly exploits 
string from the set and form an SQL injection attack. We formalized a fitness function to 
maximize the attacks generations. The randomly generated attacks scenarios are applied 
on the software under test and are evaluated using the fitness function. Our experiments 
show promising results in detection of SQL injection vulnerabilities by generating attack 
scenarios.  
Furthermore, we compared our results with a well-established SQL injection 
vulnerabilities detection tool [43]. Our approach successfully detected more SQL injection 
vulnerabilities with less false positive and false negative ratio. Finally, we presented 
refactoring approach to correct the detected SQL injection vulnerabilities. Using 
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refactoring approach, we applied the remedies to vulnerable queries automatically and 
efficiently. 
8.2.2 XSS Detection and Correction 
Similar to SQL injection vulnerability detection and correction, we also presented a genetic 
based approach to detect Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities. Cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities are classified into three types, namely, reflected, persistent and DOM based. 
Our presented approach can detect all three types of XSS. To start with the detection 
process, we use a state of the art vulnerability detection tool named RIPs [43]. The purpose 
of using the tool is to identify the vulnerable points in the source code; the tool we used 
can generate false positive and false negatives so we will make sure the authenticity of the 
detected vulnerabilities using test data generated by our genetic approach.  
We formulated an attack patterns database by collecting the XSS attack patterns from 
different resources [5, 44] which can be easily extended with new attack patterns as they 
emerge in future. The attack patterns database is used as a seeding source for genetic 
algorithm’s population, which is further evolved to generate XSS attack patters for source 
code under testing. Every source code has different control flow paths in it, which carry 
out different logical operations. Different user input can make the source code to follow a 
different control flow path, which may or may not be vulnerable to XSS vulnerabilities. To 
make the source code XSS free and to verify every possible control flow path is secure to 
XSS attacks we converted the source code into control flow paths and generated tree graphs 
to illustrate them.  
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Once we have obtained the control flow paths, we used genetic algorithm to generate test 
data to flow through each possible control flow path to uncover maximum vulnerable paths 
in the source code. Our genetic test data generation is developed in the same environment 
and language as the source code under testing so we can execute the vulnerable paths 
without any compatibility or integrity issues. We designed genetic algorithm formulation 
in a way that it will generate random population from XSS attack patterns database, which 
will undergo further genetic operations. We formulated a fitness function to minimize the 
XSS vulnerabilities in source code and to maximize the attack patterns generation. Our 
empirical evaluation shows that the proposed genetic approach generated multiple attack 
scenarios for a single vulnerable path and successfully uncovered the maximum XSS 
vulnerabilities in the source code.  
8.2.3 Implications 
The problem of test data generation and automated testing for uncovering the security 
vulnerabilities in web applications is still a challenging job. Our presented approach can 
leverage the laborious and difficult job of test data generation for security vulnerabilities 
testing in web applications. Furthermore, our approach has important and useful 
implications for both researchers and practitioners. Genetic algorithm is useful tool for 
optimizing and searching the large search space problems, but it has not been used for web 
security threats detection. As result of our work, there is further possibilities for the 
research community to apply the genetic approach to detect the security misconfiguration 
vulnerabilities or to detect the Broken Authentication and Session Management 
vulnerabilities. 
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For security testing practitioners our approach provides an automated way of test data 
generation by generating the real time SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities attack 
scenario. This can help in reducing the efforts and human resources required to detect the 
SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities in web applications with good efficiency. 
Furthermore, our approach is capable of generating multiple attack scenarios for both SQL 
injection XSS vulnerabilities so that, the maximum vulnerabilities can be uncovered in the 
source code with minimum number of false positives and false negatives. 
8.3 Threats to Validity 
In this section, we discuss potential threats to validity for our work. To implement the 
proposed approach, we used Object Oriented Programming (OOP) paradigm. To encode 
the solutions in genetic algorithm’s chromosomes we used arrays as data structure. The 
performance may be improved if some other data structures are used like heaps or binary 
trees, it may also improve the overall execution time. 
For both SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities, we collected the attack patters/exploit 
strings from both published literature and well established industry de-facto security web 
sites. However, it is possible that we have missed some attack patters for SQL injection or 
XSS or for both vulnerabilities. The attack patterns may be different or evolved in future 
but our approach is flexible enough to add them in our database.  
Finally, for XSS detection we relied on a third party scanning tool for preliminary scanning 
which is expected to have false positives and false negatives which may affect the results. 
Furthermore, we carried out limited number of experiments with medium sized control 
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flow paths for XSS attack generations. More experiments need to be performed by 
considered large size source code. 
8.4 Limitations 
In this section, we will describe the limitations in our research work. Our approach 
considered two most recurring vulnerabilities those are SQL injection and XSS. There exist 
more vulnerabilities those are dangerous but due to different nature of each vulnerability 
we did not formalized a generic approach. So the first limitation of our approach is that, it 
can only detect SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities in web applications. Due to diverse 
nature and different modes of attack of each vulnerability, we can generalize an approach 
to work for all vulnerabilities but our approach can easily be extended for other 
vulnerabilities. In our research work, we have considered the source code analysis of only 
one specific language for SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities detection that is PHP. The 
implemented tool is not being tested with other language’s source code like classic asp and 
jsp.  
The detection process depends on the attack patterns we have collected from different 
resources for both SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities. New attack patterns may emerge 
in future and there is a possibility that we have missed some of the patterns. The scanner 
we developed for SQL injections preliminary scanning has limitations as well. The scanner 
can easily detect an un-sanitized user input if it is directly embedded to the SQL query. It 
can also even detect the un-sanitized user input if the input value is first assigned to another 
variable and then supplied in SQL query. But the scanner will not be able to detect the un-
sanitized user input if the input is coming from different scope for example if the input is 
coming from a different file, class or function the scanner will not be able to backtrack it. 
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Finally, due to the unavailability of any standard bench mark we performed the 
experiments on best available resources. Performing further experiments on more diverse 
and large scale applications can reveals further limitations and qualities or our approach. 
8.5 Future Work 
As a part of future work, we are planning to expand our approach for other types of 
vulnerabilities among top ten specifically for, broken authentication, security 
misconfiguration and insecure direct object reference. Our approach is flexible to be 
extended for the above mentioned vulnerabilities. furthermore, our future plan also 
includes to enhance our static code scanner so it can back track and identify unsecure and 
un-sanitized user inputs in different scopes. we also planning to enhance the overall 
performance of our implemented tool by enhancing the attack patterns database and the 
fitness function along with that we are planning to try other encoding schemes for 
individual representations. We want to make our tool generic so we can use it with the 
source code of other web application languages like asp and jsp. We plan to bundle our 
approach in a well-designed tool, which can detect multiple security vulnerabilities in web 
applications with minimum false positives and false negatives along with the generation of 
attack scenarios so the practitioners can benefit from it to remove security vulnerabilities 
from their applications. Finally, our experimental analysis includes false positives and false 
negatives results, in future we also planning to include the true positive and true negatives 
analysis in experimental results. 
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Appendix 
Preliminary Scanning Code for Vulnerable Queries Detection 
<?php 
function ReadDirectory($Dir) 
{ 
    $FileInfo = new SplFileInfo($Dir); 
    if($FileInfo->isFile() || $FileInfo->isDir()) 
    { 
        if($FileInfo->isFile()) 
        { 
            if($FileInfo->getExtension() == 'php') 
            { 
                $handle = @fopen($Dir, "r"); 
                if ($handle)  
                { 
                    unset($vars_array); 
                    while (($buffer = fgets($handle, 4096)) !== false)  
                    { 
                        if(preg_match('/(SELECT|UPDATE|DELETE)/', 
strtoupper($buffer)) && strstr(strtoupper($buffer), 'WHERE') && 
!strstr($buffer, '$_SESSION')) 
                         
                        { 
                            $buffer = substr($buffer, strpos($buffer, 
'=')+1, strlen($buffer)); 
                            $buffer = str_replace('"', '', $buffer); 
                            $buffer = str_replace(';', '', $buffer); 
                            $parser = new PHPSQLParser($buffer, true); 
                            $string = ''; 
                            foreach($parser->parsed['WHERE'] as 
$wherearray) 
                            { 
                                $string .= implode(" ", $wherearray); 
                            } 
                            if(strstr($string 
,'mysql_real_escape_string') || strstr($string, 
'mysqli_real_escape_string')) 
                            { 
                                 
                            } 
                            else 
                            { 
                                fitnesscalc::$solution[] = $FileInfo-
>getFilename().' | '.trim($buffer); 
                            } 
                        } 
                    } 
99 
 
                    if (!feof($handle))  
                    { 
                        echo "Error: unexpected fgets() fail\n"; 
                    } 
                    fclose($handle); 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        else if($FileInfo->isDir()) 
        { 
            $scan = glob(rtrim($Dir,'/').'/*'); 
            foreach($scan as $index=>$path)  
            { 
                ReadDirectory($path); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        header('Location:index.php?show=file'); 
    } 
} 
?> 
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GA Process 
<?php  
error_reporting(0);session_start(); 
require_once('Vulnerabel_Applications/customfiles/config.php'); 
require_once('classes/PHP_SQL_Parser/src/PHPSQLParser.php'); 
require_once('classes/PHP_SQL_Parser/src/PHPSQLCreator.php'); 
require_once('classes/individual.php'); 
require_once('classes/population.php'); 
require_once('classes/fitnesscalc.php'); 
require_once('classes/algorithm.php'); 
require_once('includes/functions.php'); 
if(isset($_POST['FindSolution']) && $_POST['FindSolution'] == 
'FindSolution') 
{ 
    $Dir = $_POST['DirName']; 
    ReadDirectory($Dir); 
    fitnesscalc::$solution = array_unique(fitnesscalc::$solution); 
     
    algorithm::$uniformRate             = 0.90; 
    algorithm::$mutationRate            = 0.1; 
    algorithm::$poolSize                = 10;       /* crossover how 
many to select in each pool to breed from */ 
    algorithm::$max_generation_stagnant = 50;   //maximum number of 
unchanged generations terminate loop 
    algorithm::$elitism                 = true;     //keep fittest 
individual  for next gen 
    $population_size            = 10;       //how many random 
individuals are in initial population (generation 0) 
    $lowest_time_s                      = 100.00;   //keeps track of 
lowest time in seconds 
    $gen_count                    = 0; 
    $generation_stagnant                = 0;  
    $most_fit                           = 0; 
    $most_fit_last                      = 400; 
     
    if(count(fitnesscalc::$solution) > 0) 
    { 
        $QueryCount = 0; 
        foreach (fitnesscalc::$solution as $Queries) 
        { 
            $QueryCount++; 
            fitnesscalc::$Query = $Queries; 
            echo "<br>Max Fitness is : ".fitnesscalc::getMaxFitness(); 
            echo "<br>-------------------------------------------------
------<br>"; 
            // generate initial population 
            $start_time = microtime(true); 
            $Population = new population($population_size, true); 
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            // Evolve the population until optimum solution found 
            while ($Population->getFittest()->getFitness() < 
fitnesscalc::getMaxFitness()) 
            { 
                $gen_count++; 
                $most_fit = $Population->getFittest()->getFitness(); 
                $Population = algorithm::evolvePopulation($Population); 
 
                if ($most_fit < $most_fit_last) 
                { 
                     
                    echo "<br> Generation: " .$gen_count." 
(Stagnant:".$generation_stagnant.") Fittest: ". 
$most_fit."/".fitnesscalc::getMaxFitness() ; 
                    echo "<br>  Best: ". $Population->getFittest(); 
                    $most_fit_last=$most_fit; 
                    $generation_stagnant=0; //reset stagnant generation 
counter 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    $generation_stagnant++; //no improvement increment 
may want to end early 
                }     
                //if( $generation_stagnant > 
algorithm::$max_generation_stagnant) 
                if( $generationCount > 5) 
                { 
                    echo "<br>-- Ending TOO MANY 
(".algorithm::$max_generation_stagnant.") stagnant generations 
unchanged. Ending APPROX solution below--<br>"; 
                    break; 
                } 
            }  //end of while loop 
                     
            //we're done 
            $finish_time = microtime(true); 
             
            echo "<br>Solution at generation: ".$gen_count. " time: 
".round($finish_time-$start_time,2)."s"; 
            echo "<br>-------------------------------------------------
--------<br>"; 
            //echo "<br>Genes   : ".$Population->getFittest() ."<br>"; 
            //echo "<br>Solution: ".implode("",fitnesscalc::$solution);  
//convert array to string 
            echo fitnesscalc::$QueryWithAttach; 
            echo "<br>-------------------------------------------------
--------<br>"; 
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            if($QueryCount > 5) 
            { 
                exit; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        header('Location:index.php?show=nothing'); 
        echo 'no vulnerable query found'; 
    } 
} 
?> 
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Individual Generation Class 
<?php 
/**********************************************************************
** 
/ Class Individual : Genetic Algorithms  
/**********************************************************************
**/ 
 
require_once('fitnesscalc.php');  //supporting class file 
 
 class individual  
 { 
    public static $logics = array("OR", "AND"); 
    public static $rules = array("LIKE", "'",  "anything'", "x'='x", 
"x%'", "_%", "1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tabname);", "DROP TABLE 
tabname;", "#", "1", "%%", "1=1", "--"); 
    public $defaultGeneLength = 3; 
    public  $genes = array();  //defines an empty  array of genes 
arbitrary length 
     
    // Cache 
    public $fitness = 0; 
     
    public function random()  
    { 
        return (float)rand()/(float)getrandmax(); 
    } 
 
    // Create a random individual 
    public function generateIndividual($size)  
    { 
        //now lets randomly load the genes to the size of the array 
        $mid = floor($size/2); 
        for ($i=0; $i < $size; $i++ ) 
        { 
            $this->genes[$i] = individual::$rules[rand(0, 
count(individual::$rules) - 1)]; 
        } 
         
        $this->genes[$mid] = individual::$logics[rand(0, 
count(individual::$logics) - 1)]; 
    } 
 
    /* Getters and setters */ 
    // Use this if you want to create individuals with different gene 
lengths 
    public function setDefaultGeneLength($length)  
    { 
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        $this->defaultGeneLength = $length; 
    } 
     
    public function getGene($index)  
    { 
        return $this->genes[$index]; 
    } 
 
    public function setGene($index,$value) { 
        $this->genes[$index] = $value; 
        $this->fitness = 0; 
    } 
 
    /* Public methods */ 
    public function size()  
    { 
        return count($this->genes); 
    } 
 
    public function getFitness()  
    { 
        if ($this->fitness == 0)  
        { 
            $this->fitness = FitnessCalc::getFitness($this);  //call 
static method to calculate fitness 
        } 
        return $this->fitness; 
    } 
     
    public function __toString()  
    { 
        $geneString = null; 
        for ($i = 0; $i <  count($this->genes); $i++)  
        { 
            $geneString .= $this->getGene($i); 
        } 
         
        return $geneString; 
    } 
} 
?> 
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Population Generation Class 
<?php 
/**********************************************************************
** 
/ Class Population : Genetic Algorithms  
/ 
/**********************************************************************
**/ 
 
require_once('individual.php');  //supporting class file 
 
class Population  
{ 
    //class properties 
    public $people=array(); 
    /** Constructors*/ 
    // Create a population 
     function __construct($populationSize, $initialise=false)  
     { 
         if (!isset($populationSize) || $populationSize==0) 
         { 
             die("Must specify a populationsize > 0"); 
         } 
         
        for ($i=0;$i<$populationSize; $i++) 
        { 
            $this->people[$i] = new individual();  //instantiate a new 
object 
        } 
        // Initialise population 
        if ($initialise)  
        { 
            // Loop and create individuals 
            for ($i = 0; $i < count($this->people); $i++)  
            { 
                $new_person = new individual(); 
                $new_person->generateIndividual(3); 
                $this->saveIndividual($i, $new_person ); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
    /* Getters */ 
     
    /* find the fittest individual in this population */ 
    public function getFittest()  
    { 
        $fittest = $this->people[0];  //create a starting point for 
fitness person0 
         
        // Loop through individuals to find fittest 
        for ($i = 0; $i < $this->size(); $i++)  
        { 
            if ($fittest->getFitness() <= $this->people[$i]-
>getFitness() )  
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            { 
                $fittest = $this->people[$i]; 
                //echo "<br>Population:getFittest() is now: ".$this-
>people[$i]->getFitness(); 
            } 
             
        } 
        //exit; 
        return $fittest; 
    } 
    /* Public methods */ 
       // get individual 
    public function getIndividual($index)  
    { 
      return  $this->people[$index]; 
    }  
    // Get population size 
    public function size()  
    { 
        return count($this->people); 
    } 
    // Save individual 
    public function saveIndividual($index, $indiv)  
    { 
        $this->people[$index] = $indiv; 
    } 
    // Sort the pool based on fitness ascending form 0...max_fitness 
    // Fitness here is a cost function so lower is better fitness 
    function  compareFitness($a, $b)  
    { 
        if($a->getFitness() == $b->getFitness() )  
        { 
            return 0; 
        } 
        return ($a->getFitness() < $b->getFitness()) ? -1 : 1; 
    } 
   //sort Population by fitness  , most fit (lowest cost first)  
    function sortPopulation() 
    { 
        return usort($this-
>people,array('population',"compareFitness")); 
    }  
    //print population and fitness for debugging uses 
     public function __toString()  
     { 
         $population_string = null; 
         for ($i = 0; $i <  count($this->people); $i++)  
         { 
             $population_string.="\n Individual: ".$this->people[$i]." 
Fitness:".$this->people[$i]->getFitness(); 
         } 
         return $population_string; 
     } 
}//end class 
?> 
 
 
107 
 
Fitness Calculation Class 
<?php 
/**********************************************************************
** 
/ Class fitnesscalc : Genetic Algorithms  
/ 
/**********************************************************************
**/ 
ob_flush(); 
require_once('individual.php');  //supporting class file 
 
class fitnesscalc  
{ 
    public static $solution =  array();  //empty array of arbitrary 
length 
    public static $Query; 
    public static $QueryWithAttach; 
    //public static $Dir; 
 
    /* Public methods */ 
    // Set a candidate solution as a byte array 
   
    // To make it easier we can use this method to set our candidate 
solution with string of 0s and 1s 
    static function setSolution($newSolution)  
    { 
         // Loop through each character of our string and save it in 
our string  array 
         fitnesscalc::$solution = str_split($newSolution); 
    } 
 
    // Calculate individuals fitness by comparing it to our candidate 
solution 
    // low fitness values are better,0=goal fitness is really a cost 
function in this instance 
    static function  getFitness($individual)  
    { 
        $fitness = 0; 
        // Loop through our individuals genes and compare them to our 
candidates 
        $Queries = explode('|', fitnesscalc::$Query); 
        $QuerryAppend = ''; 
        for ($i=0; $i < $individual->size(); $i++ ) 
        { 
            $QuerryAppend .= $individual->genes[$i].' '; 
        } 
         
        if(preg_match('/(SELECT|UPDATE|DELETE)/', $Queries[1])) 
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        { 
            $parser = new PHPSQLParser($Queries[1], true); 
            $QuerryAppend = str_replace('tabname', $parser-
>parsed['FROM'][0]['base_expr'], $QuerryAppend); 
            $parser->parsed['WHERE'][2]['base_expr'] = 
"'".trim($QuerryAppend)."'"; 
            $creater = new PHPSQLCreator($parser->parsed, true); 
            $Result = mysql_query($creater->created); 
            if(mysql_errno()) 
            { 
                $fitness = $fitness + 0; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                if(strstr(strtoupper($Queries[1]), 'SELECT')) 
                { 
                    if(mysql_num_rows($Result) > 0) 
                    { 
                        $fitness = $fitness + 1; 
                        fitnesscalc::$QueryWithAttach = $creater-
>created; 
                    } 
                    else 
                    { 
                        $fitness = $fitness + 0; 
                    } 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    $fitness = $fitness + 1; 
                    fitnesscalc::$QueryWithAttach = $creater->created; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        flush(); 
        return $fitness;  //inverse of cost function 
    } 
     
    // Get optimum fitness 
    static function getMaxFitness()  
    { 
        $maxFitness = 1; //maximum matches assume each exact charaters 
yields fitness 1 
        return $maxFitness; 
    } 
}  //end class 
?> 
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Genetic Operators 
<?php 
/**********************************************************************
** 
/ Class geneticAlgorithm : Genetic Algorithms  
/ 
/**********************************************************************
**/ 
 
require_once('individual.php');  //supporting class file 
require_once('population.php');  //supporting class file 
 
class algorithm  
{ 
    /* GA parameters */ 
    public static $poolSize = 10;  /* When selecting for crossover how 
large each pool should be */ 
    public static $max_generation_stagnant = 50;  /*how many unchanged 
generations before we end */ 
    public static $elitism = true; 
 
    /* Public methods */ 
     
    // Convenience random function 
    private static function random()  
    { 
        return (float)rand()/(float)getrandmax();  /* return number 
from 0 .. 1 as a decimal */ 
    } 
     
    public static function evolvePopulation( $pop)  
    { 
        $newPopulation = new population($pop->size(), false); 
        // Keep our best individual 
        if (algorithm::$elitism)  
        { 
            $newPopulation->saveIndividual(0, $pop->getFittest()); 
        } 
 
        // Crossover population 
        $elitismOffset=0; 
        if (algorithm::$elitism)  
        { 
            $elitismOffset = 1; 
        }  
        else  
        { 
            $elitismOffset = 0; 
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        } 
         
        // Loop over the population size and create new individuals 
with 
        // crossover 
        for ($i = $elitismOffset; $i < $pop->size(); $i++)  
        {     
            $indiv1 = algorithm::poolSelection($pop); 
            $indiv2 = algorithm::poolSelection($pop); 
            $newIndiv =  algorithm::crossover($indiv1, $indiv2); 
            $newPopulation->saveIndividual($i, $newIndiv); 
        } 
 
        // Mutate population 
     
        for ($i= $elitismOffset; $i < $newPopulation->size(); $i++)  
        { 
            algorithm::mutate($newPopulation->getIndividual($i)); 
        } 
        return $newPopulation; 
    } 
 
    // Crossover individuals (aka reproduction) 
    private static function  crossover($indiv1, $indiv2)  
     { 
       $newSol = new individual();  //create a offspring 
        // Loop through genes 
        for ($i=0; $i < $indiv1->size(); $i++)  
        { 
            // Crossover at which point 0..1 , .50 50% of time 
            if (  algorithm::random() <= algorithm::$uniformRate) 
            { 
                $newSol->setGene($i, $indiv1->getGene($i) ); 
            }  
            else  
            { 
                $newSol->setGene($i, $indiv2->getGene($i)); 
            } 
        } 
        //exit; 
        return $newSol; 
    } 
 
    // Mutate an individual 
    private static function mutate( $indiv)  
    { 
        // Loop through genes 
        for ($i=0; $i < $indiv->size(); $i++)  
        { 
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            if (algorithm::random() <= algorithm::$mutationRate)  
            { 
                $gene = individual::$rules[rand(0, 
count(individual::$rules) - 1)]; 
                // Create random gene 
                $indiv->setGene($i, $gene); //substitute the gene into 
the individual 
            } 
        }//exit; 
    } 
 
    // Select a pool of individuals for crossover 
    private static function poolSelection($pop)  
    { 
        // Create a pool population 
        $pool = new population(algorithm::$poolSize, false); 
         
        for ($i=0; $i < algorithm::$poolSize; $i++)  
        { 
            $randomId = rand(0, $pop->size()-1 ); //Get a random 
individual from anywhere in the population 
            $pool->saveIndividual($i, $pop->getIndividual( $randomId)); 
        } 
        // Get the fittest 
        $fittest = $pool->getFittest(); 
        return $fittest; 
    } 
}  //class 
?> 
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